Daily Report

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Dertliev, Konstantinova: 'No Split in SDS'

AU1104074691 Sofia BTA in English 2133 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 10 (BTA)—"The Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) remains united despite the formation of a centre and a right wing," opposition leaders Dr. Petur Dertliev and Prof. Elka Konstantinova said today in a televised interview following the declaration of the Social Democrats and the Nikola Petkov Agrarian Party. The two leaders predicted that the Socialists (ex-Communists), who had been aspiring to split the SDS, will be disappointed.

"There are differences in the Bulgarian Socialist Party, but the Socialists are unanimous in their desire to stay in power. We are different in the SDS, but we are unanimous in our purpose to change the system. When the totalitarian regime is finished, we will be friendly opponents. Today we laid the groundwork of future political life," Dr. Dertliev, leader of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, said in the televised interview.

Dr. Dertliev ruled out the possibility for cooperation between the SDS Centre and the Socialists.

Prof. Elka Konstantinova, leader of the Radical Democratic Party, which belongs to the right wing in the SDS, confirmed that there is no split in the SDS. It is normal for the coalition to have a centre and a right wing. However, this is not the same as a split in the coalition which fights for the ultimate victory of democracy. Prof. Konstantinova and Dr. Dertliev said that according to the prevailing opinion in the SDS, the new parliamentary elections should be held as soon as possible.

Opposition Agrarians Seeking Political Alliance

AU1104074491 Sofia BTA in English 2133 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 10 (BTA)—The Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian Party and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, affiliated to the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), announced today the setting up of SDS Centre.

Their political declaration motivates this action with the infiltration into the SDS of vestiges of the old branches and the newly founded factions and movements of the ex-Communist Party, which jeopardizes the unity of democratic forces, and delaying democratic reforms in this country. This situation helps former and present leaders preserve their organizations, they keep plundering national wealth and remain in power, the declaration says.

The declaration criticizes SDS initiatives which enable a "group of aggressive people to manipulate the organization." The declaration also criticizes the formation of local structures and civil committees which threaten the unity of the SDS. The declaration considers their practices similar to the Bolshevik tactics of conquering the organization from within.

The SDS Centre was set up after differences arose in the SDS over the timing of the elections.

According to a member of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, the Green Party and Ecoglasnost will probably join the SDS Centre.

The Radical Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, the United Democratic Centre and non-parliamentary neoliberal parties recently formed a right wing in the SDS.

Possibility of Rift in Government Suggested

AU1004125391 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 5 Apr 91 pp 1, 2

[DUMA report: "Something Happening in Government"]

[Text] Internal Affairs Minister Khristo Danov and Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandur Tomov had to resign in writing before a decision on the cadre changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was acceptable by all could be adopted. This was revealed by sources close to the government. According to the sources, relations in the coalition cabinet are far from rosy.

Aleksandur Tomov and Dimitur Ludzhev no longer greet each other, the same sources claim. Sources close to the cabinet do not categorically say whether this is a result of the incompatibility of the two ministers' personalities or the intoxication with power on the part of some newcomers in this sphere.

Many people explain the lack of a government program with the lack of understanding in the cabinet. During the festive celebration of the first 100 days of the new cabinet, it became evident that the reform is progressing well without a program. Only four days later, however, Dimitur Ludzhev revealed to the public that the reform was actually stuck. Evil tongues claim that Mr. Ludzhev was on vacation during those four days. He spent it outside Sofia, but by no means in solitude.

After his return, it turned out that the socialist ministers were hindering the reform. Now many people wonder about the context in which Mr. Ludzhev's outburst should be viewed. The deputy prime minister himself denies the suspicion that he striving to strengthen the unpopular efforts of the rightist elements within the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] to organize legislative elections in the midst of the economic reform. Whether gently or sharply, Ludzhev often repeats that the elections will slow down the reform.

He admits, however, that many of his friends and opposition members find that his enthusiasm with the reform is excessive. According to them this could make

them miss the appropriate moment for inflicting the crucial strike against socialism-communism.

In any event, the Council of Ministers has noticed the tendency to replace those cadres of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union [BZNS] and the SDS in the provisional administrations who have a weakness for compromises and understanding with the Socialists. High-ranking members of the opposition created enough opportunities to conquer the administration structures already before the election. After the unification of the opposition the Socialists are a minority in the executive committees, even where more than 70 percent of the population voted with a red ballot.

As far as the reform is concerned, it needs not only a monetary but also a structural concept, Aleksandur Tomov thinks. Recently, he said that of all SDS ministers he has the best rapport with Ivan Kostov. Only about two weeks ago Ludzhev also used to speak about the necessity of having a plan for the second phase of the reform, which will deal with restructuring the economy.

The ideas for the structural reform must come from the superministry of Ivan Pushkarov. What is known about him is that he spent most of the month abroad and that he has not submitted specific plans for the demonopolization for a discussion by the Council of Ministers. There appears to be some decision, but it is on a very abstract macro-level.

Under such conditions, Prime Minister Popov must reconcile himself to the contradictions in his cabinet and preserve the coalition. The rumor says that already organized trips abroad of the Prime Minister did not materialize. Who was capable of foiling the trips is an open question, precisely as the question of whether somebody else does not actually try to run the government.

Yesterday [4 April], after a stormy closed meeting of the government, about which the reporters did not receive any information, the prime minister spoke on television. He calmed the Socialist ministers down, and exonerated them of all guilt. According to him, there are economic leaders who do not understand the rules of a market economy. Many people were left with the impression that precisely as in the good old days "good decisions are adopted at the top and the people agree with them" but the middle-level administrators foil them."

According to the prime minister everything Mr. Ludzhev said was correct. The journalists have taken his wise thoughts out of context.

In this context, well-informed sources say that a new post on the payroll has been foreseen especially for the Presidency and the Council of Ministers—the post of interpreter.

Landowners Join Forces With Cooperative Union

AU1104090091 Sofia BTA in English 0749 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Tanya Tsekova report]

[Text] Sofia, April 11 (BTA)—The Bulgarian parliament passed the Land Act which, however, did not solve the problems of the ailing Bulgarian agriculture. The owners who are to get back their land have no farming machinery and equipment. This is the result of the communist policy which barred farmers from buying means of production. Now the landowners have no tractors, planter machines, combine harvesters or threshing machines, no seeds or fertilizers and many of them lack even rudimentary knowledge of agriculture, stock breeding or farm management.

The present plight of the Bulgarian agriculture has prompted the Union of Landowners and the Central Cooperative Union to join forces and sign a cooperation agreement. The idea of the association is to help restore the ownership of land and set up private farms. The two unions will use the established infrastructure of the cooperative system which provides all the necessary conditions to organize modern farming. The association will safeguard the interests of private owners and will promote the free movement of people and investment.

The association is trying to negotiate the delivery of tractors to Bulgaria but the rate of the Bulgarian lev against the dollar makes Western machinery unaffordable. The union is also negotiating the import of about 3,000 Soviet-made tractors and the Central Cooperative Union has asked the respective authorities to reduce the custom duties and taxes on farming equipment which amount to 60 per cent of its price. There are also suggestions for the association to buy the machinery and then rent it to private farmers. The association will propose to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Services that certain quantities of meat be exported in return for farming equipment.

Preparations and medicine worth eighteen million U.S. dollars imported under the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] Programme will be up for sale soon.

Striking Students Continue Ruse Sit-In

AU1004174191 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1630 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Ruse students continued for the second day their sit-in in the central teaching building of the Ruse Technical University. In the presence of the chairman of the interim municipal council, the first contacts were established between the strikers and the academic leadership.

Late in the afternoon, supporters of the Bulgarian Student Union and the movement of worried women, as it

is described according to our information, held a silent vigil in front of the building as a mark of their protest against the strike.

At its meeting, the Academic Council adopted a resolution to apply efforts to ensure that academic classes proceed as normally as possible and to continue the talks with the striking students.

Government To Draft Nuclear Accident Plan

AU1104091291 Sofia BTA in English 2124 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 10 (BTA)—By the year's end Bulgaria will have a national plan for protection of the population in the event of an accident at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, meeting international standards and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] requirements. Ecologists and the general public have been particularly sensitive about nuclear safety.

The decision to draw up the plan was made by a government commission which met today to consider the results of a two-day command-post civil defence drill based on a scenario simulating an accident at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant which results in radioactive contamination of the entire country.

Judging by the results of the drill, the civil defence system has satisfactory readiness to cope with a nightmarish option like that by standards which the commission's chairman Mr. Aleksandur Tomov described as "East European."

Indicatively, the three tonnes of potassium iodide, needed for iodine prophylaxis of all Bulgaria in the event of radioactive contamination, proved "missing" as the competent ministry just intended to import the stuff if necessary.

Mr. Tomov, who is deputy prime minister, said that Bulgarian scientists have developed specialized food and forages absorbing radionuclides which meet and even surpass world standards, but they are gathering dust in various safes because they are regarded as "top secret." They must be declassified and used sensibly, Mr. Tomov believes.

Prof. Bonchev, head of the Atomic Physics Department at Sofia University, dismissed as speculation the publications which describe the situation in the plant as tragic. There have been reports that the Kozloduy N-Plant is on the "brink of disaster." There is no such thing. The plant functions normally and we don't expect any accidents, the expert said. Together with his colleagues he conducted a several months long study of the operation of the plant.

Prof. Bonchev, however, welcomed the special mode of operation introduced by the government for the four old Soviet-built VVER-400 reactors. Under this mode of operation, the staff manning the reactors will get pay rises along with higher responsibilities, including criminal liability, for the trouble-free operation of the plant, a storage facility for nuclear waste will be built and other safety measures will be taken.

Bulgaria will count on international financial support for making Kozloduy safe by international standards, "a problem with transboundary implications," as Mr. Tomov described it. He stressed Sofia's desire to work seriously and responsibly to guarantee the safe operation of the Kozloduy plant. In May the Civil Defence will hold a nationwide exercise to test reaction to a nuclear accident there. Also in May, experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency will hold a special seminar to familiarize Bulgarian experts with the IAEA requirements for the safe operation of nuclear power plants.

Dzhagarov Blames Communism, Moscow for Disasters

AU1004193991 Sofia BTA in English 1844 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Ognyan Branichev report]

[Text] Sofia, April 10 (BTA)—"Communist ideology and Moscow are to blame for the hardships that have befallen Bulgaria," Mr. Georgi Dzhagarov, vice president of the State Council for twenty years or so, told the court hearing the Zhivkov/Balev case today. He added that the system was imposed on this country and even the former head of state tried hard to extricate himself from it, the general secretary of general secretaries in the former socialist countries was in Moscow.

Mr. Dzhagarov, until recently a much vaunted poet, had been chairman of the Bulgarian Writers Union for six years before he became a statesman. He explained how he had obtained a Western-made limo through the former Security and Protection Department on the strength of his privileges. He also made some sweeping statements about the years of "socialist construction."

The former vice president of the State Council was among the first to distance themselves from the old system and their own past after November 10, 1989. A month after Zhivkov's ouster Mr. Dzhagarov renounced his Communist Party membership and left the parliamentary faction of the Bulgarian Communist Party to become an independent MP in the previous parliament.

Mr. Dzhagarov stated that he met with the "chief's" understanding when he confided to him his anxiety over the nature of the system. The poet stressed that violence, the fatal flaw of communist ideology, had caused all disasters since October 1917. He said that the Bulgarian Communist Party has not been able to differ in its decisions from Moscow since the time the Soviet Army was greeted with flowers in this country, "just as the German Army had been before," the witness quipped.

According to Mr. Dzhagarov, Todor Zhivkov admitted to his closest allies that the Soviet system was really barbarous.

The witness concluded that "besides the national pyramid there was also an international one, and the general secretary of general secretaries in the former socialist countries was in Moscow."

Film director Nikola Korabov, who obtained a flat with Zhivkov's help, tried to find excuses for the artistic community, members of which were witnesses at the trial. Mr. Korabov claimed that even when actors and artists in general obtained something with Zhivkov's help, they could not be bought and sold.

Today Zhivkov put on earphones to have a better hearing of the witnesses' evidence.

PHARE Expert Promises Agricultural Aid

AU1104092791 Sofia BTA in English 2130 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 10 (BTA)—By the end of April Bulgaria will receive 30,000 tonnes of forage barley and veterinary medicine worth more than ECU [European currency units] 2,000,000, earmarked for the development of private farming in Bulgaria. PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] farming expert Stewart Campbell told a news conference here today. More than ECU 14,000,000 will be allocated, including over three million for maize and potato seed and over two million for plant protection.

Mr. Campbell said that a group of PHARE experts will be formed with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations to conduct a market research and then assist the land reform. There is an idea of cooperation with the EC Statistical Office. Bulgarian private farmers organizations will also be helped by an undertaking to train experts in agricultural law and agro-business managers.

Committee on Nationality Problems Formed in Sofia

AU1004174391 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1630 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] In Sofia today a Public Committee on Nationality Problems [Obshtestven komitet po natsionalnite problemi] was formed. Its founders include Bulgarian scholars, politicians, and public figures, united by the conviction that today, more than ever, Bulgaria needs a long-term policy and overall strategy on the nationality issue.

The members of the committee aim to draft and submit to the state services general principles for an overall nationality policy. The committee declared that it is independent and stands above party interests, and that every participant in the committee represents only himself.

Mr. Ginyo Ganev, deputy chairman of the Grand National Assembly, was elected chairman of the newly formed Public Committee on Nationality Problems.

Kalugin To Testify in Georgi Markov Case

AU1104101991 Sofia BTA in English 0952 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 11 (BTA)—Former KGB General Oleg Kalugin will be questioned on the Georgi Markov case. Mr. Kalugin disclosed certain facts concerning the murder of the Bulgarian dissident writer Georgi Markov in London in 1978 and said he was willing to give evidence on the case. Mr. Martin Gunev, Bulgaria's prosecutor general, and Col. Liko Yotsov, the Armed Forces' prosecutor, say in an interview for "SVOBODEN NAROD."

Col. Yotsov explains that before its dissolution last year the former National Assembly voted through certain Criminal Code amendments which impede the present investigation. According to him, this was done on purpose so that certain criminal acts could never be detected. One of the amendments grants persons immunity from remand in custody when important state and public interests require it. That is why the three former State Security generals who admitted having destroyed Georgi Markov's police file would get away with it.

Today's "DEMOKRATSIYA" runs a statement by a former secret service officer who says he will help the investigation but wishes to remain unidentified. According to him, Georgi Markov's case could be solved within a month unless it is obstructed by some unexpected "suicides" or "accidents."

According to the anonymous source, the "operation" was masterminded and carried out in three stages. The first, called a "scenario," was elaborated by two top party and state officials and a playwright. The circle of the initiated was expanded only after the respective party had given the green light to the KGB to cooperate. The former secret service officer hints that as far as the "initiated" and the participants are concerned, it will be interesting to trace published and unpublished decisions conferring the highest honorary titles on certain people (Oleg Kalugin himself holds the Bulgarian Order of the Red Banner) and to investigate all Bulgarian "businessmen," "tourists" and "guests," who visited Britain a month before the assassination.

FRG's Foreign Minister Pays Official Visit

Visit Previewed

LD1004174791 Prague CTK in English 1428 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Prague April 10 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak and German foreign ministers, Jiri Dienstbier and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, will discuss tomorrow during Genscher's day-long working visit to Prague the drafting of a bilateral treaty.

The new agreement is to replace the 1973 treaty on mutual reltions, which was the first major political document between the FRG and Czechoslovakia after World War II.

Work on the treaty with Germany has reached the most advanced stage of all the bilateral treaties which Czechoslovakia wants to conclude at a qualitatively new level with the signatory states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Czechoslovakia, which is pushing for a new all-European security system, would like the bilateral treaties to express the signatories' commitment to the establishment of such a system and the initiation of mechanisms for bilateral consultations on the subject.

The major aim of the new treaty with Germany is to strengthen the good neighbourly relations that are beneficial for both sides. Thus far Czechoslovakia's major trading partner has been the Soviet Union. However, in view of the decline in Soviet markets and the changeover by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trading bloc to hard-currency accounting, trade with Germany may soon exceed that with the USSR. Until German unification, West Germay was Czechoslovakia's biggest western partner with an annual trade turnover of 4,500 million Deutschemarks, and the former German Democratic Republic was the second biggest Eastern partner with an annual trade exchange worth 3,000 million roubles.

Through the treaty Czechoslovakia seeks a definitive settlement of issues, including property claims, connected with the transfer of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia after World War II under the Potsdam agreements of 1945. At a press conference yesterday, Dienstbier said the prepared treaty "in no way challenges the Czechoslovak borders and neither the German government nor the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft demands restitution of the property of Sudeten Germans".

Genscher Arrives in Prague

LD1104085991 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0830 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] FRG Foreign Affairs Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher arrived in Prague for a short working visit today. Foreign Affairs Minister Jiri Dienstbier welcomed the guest at Prague Airport.

Talks during Genscher's seven-hour visit will focus chiefly on the treaty between Czechoslovakia and Germany. Genscher will meet with President Vaclav Havel and Prime Minister Marian Calfa.

Received by Calfa

LD1104103891 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1000 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa received in the Hrzan Palace in Prague today German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who is on a short working visit in our country.

In the course of talks on preparations for the Czechoslovak-German Treaty, both statesman agreed that negotiations should be left to experts for the time being. Only if they are not able to reach a specific agreement will it be necessary for a constructive political solution.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Marian Calfa also discussed possibilities of economic cooperation and the strengthening of contacts on common borders. They exchanged views on the process of European integration.

Bilateral Treaty Discussed

LD1104155791 Prague CTK in English 1340 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] Prague April 11 (CTK)—Talks on a bilateral Czechoslovak-German treaty should be left up to experts and political solutions should be sought only in case they fail to reach agreement, Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher agreed today.

Calfa said that the treaty should draw a line behind Czechoslovak-German history and build foundations for the future. He said that in the rectification of past injustice Czechoslovakia will not go to before February 25, 1948, the day of the communist takeover.

Genscher said that work on the treaty should continue and its political assessment should be left till the end of the talks. In his opinion it is not correct to emphasize only one point and in work on the treaty subordinate to the dictate of certain groups.

Calfa and Genscher agreed that the Soviet Union must be fully integrated into the European processes. Genscher feared lest the justified efforts of the East European nations to strengthen their own identity lead to renationalization of the European process. He spoke about Germany's support to the effort of Central and East European states to join the European Community.

Calfa told Genscher that Czechoslovakia has suffered a loss of some 1,800 million marks as a result of the unification of Germany. Genscher said that economic

reforms in the lands which formerly constituted the German Democratic Republic will take some time.

Calfa complained that only less than a half of the quota of 20,000 jobs for Czechoslovak citizens in Germany this year, agreed during his visit to Bonn last year, has so far been filled. He said that Czechoslovakia would also appreciate an opportunity for its apprentices to be trained in Germany and Genscher promised to help.

Calfa and Genscher agreed upon the need to strengthen regional cooperation, especially along common borders.

During an audience at the archbishop's palace later in the day, attended by Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek and new Prague Archbishop Miloslav Vlk, Genscher said he wished European borders existed only in geographical atlases.

He said that after their unification 80 million Germans do not want to arouse fears and come up with territorial claims, on the contrary, Germany is interested in continuing the process of European unification.

Referring to the current debates in Czechoslovakia on Czech-Slovak relations, Genscher stated that creating new borders in the East at the moment when they are being abolished in the West would be an anachronism.

Assembly Accepts NATO Association Status

LD1004213991 Prague CTK in English 1957 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Prague April 10 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (parliament) accepted the offer by NATO's North Atlantic Assembly of association status with it in the form of an "association delegation", in a resolution approved here today by the House of Nations Foreign Affairs Committee.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the other chamber of the Federal Assembly, the House of the People, did not form a quorum.

The resolution said that the Federal Assembly appreciated the North Atlantic Assembly's interest in promoting cooperation between the assembly and Central and East European countries towards the creation of a new system of security and cooperation in Europe.

Deputies Protest Ex-Communist's Appointment

AU1004125091 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 6 Apr 91 p 2

["nel, zpo"-signed report: "Deputies Disagree"]

[Text] Prague— During yesterday's meeting of the Federal Assembly, 123 out of 215 deputies present signed a petition, which they addressed to the Office of the President of the Republic. In the petition they express their disagreement with a resolution of the Federal Government recommending to the president of the Republic that he entrust Cestmir Cisar [member of the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the sixties and a leading figure of the "Obroda" club associating reform communists] with the post of the CSFR's permanent representative to the Council of Europe. "We insist that all personnel decisions of such significance be confirmed by the Federal Assembly," the deputies state.

Korinkova on Return of KSC, SSM Property

LD1004225191 Prague CTK in English 2011 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Prague April 10 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Minister of Control Kvetoslava Korinkova briefed here today the Federal Assembly (parliament) Presidium on the fulfilment of constitutional laws on the return of the property of the Communist Party (KSC), The Socialist Union of Youth (SSM) and former social organizations to the Czechoslovak people.

Korinkova told a press conference which followed the session that the entire property of the Communist Party should have been returned by the end of March and of the Socialist Union of Youth by the end of April. Discussions on this issue still continue as the deadline for the return of the KSC property had to be put off to May 31 and of the SSM to the end of April. She rejected some deputies' allegations that the property got lost but admitted a lot of machinations in this sphere.

Only 80 per cent of KSC and SSM property has been returned so far. The returned KSC property is estimated at some 500 million crowns [korunas]. The entire value of the current SSM property is about 3,300 million crowns.

Socialist Party Favors Tripartite Federation

LD1004173191 Prague CTK in English 1528 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Prague April 10 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Socialist Party (CSS) is in favour of one Czechoslovak state formed by three provinces—Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, and Slovakia, party officials told journalists today.

The Socialists, one of the four non-communist parties under communist rule in Czechoslovakia, believe the state should be based on a system of self-governing towns and villages and must respect the natural historical and national identity of its regions.

Party Deputy Chairwoman Blanka Hykova and Central Secretary Pavel Hirs said the party is convinced that this structure would streamline the system of state bodies and make them more efficient, improve coordination of legislative work and reduce bureaucracy, thus saving money.

Czechoslovakia is currently a federation of two republics, Czech and Slovak. As new federal and regional constitutions are in the process of being drawn up,

various options for the future setup of the country have come under consideration. Some Slovak politicians have made clear their view that the status of Moravia and Silesia should be settled within the Czech part of the federation but others, such as Deputy Premier Jan Carnogursky, have since indicated that a tripartite federation would be acceptable.

The Socialists, who have just over 20,000 members and say they never want to be a mass membership party, also proposed the legislative system for such a federation: it should be formed by a bicameral assembly, with one chamber based on proportional representation and the other formed by the three provincial assemblies. There would be a federal government, and a faction calling itself the National Social Party split from the Socialist Party in September 1990. [sentence as received] It declared itself the successor to the socially progressive Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, one of the suppressed parties from which the Czechoslovak Socialist Party was formed after the communist takeover in February 1948. Hykova and Hirs said, however, today that the Socialist Party has now received a court order legalizing its claim to being the successor to the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, including its property.

Expert on Amount, Treatment of Radioactive Waste

AU1004123091 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY (NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY Supplement) in Czech 6 Apr 91 p 4

[Article by Jiri Kriz from the Central Geological Institute: "What To Do With Radioactive 'Waste'; Will Our Children or Grandchildren Be Made To Pay?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The reactors of all Czechoslovak nuclear power stations of the VVER 440 type (Mochovce, Jaslovske Bohunice, Dukovany) produce about 100 tonnes of spent fuel annually. By the year 2000 they will have produced about 1,165 tonnes of it. If we add to this the 95 tonnes that the Temelin nuclear power station of the VVER 1,000 type is expected to produce by then, we arrive at 1,260 tonnes. By the year 2040 when all these nuclear power stations will have reached the end of their planned service life, they will have produced 8,314 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel.

At first, for about three years before they cool off sufficiently to allow them to be stored in temporary storage areas, spent fuel rods are kept directly in the main production unit. Spent fuel rods from Mochovce and Dukovany are then being stored in a temporary storage area on the site of the Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear power station. The capacity of this storage area will last, however, only until 1993. It is hard to say what will happen then. At the beginning of 1989, it became apparent that the Soviet Union would no longer be interested in taking these rods from us, and if they were to take them, then it would only be for temporary storage at a cost of 247 rubles (or 2,519 korunas at the 1988 exchange rate) per kilogram. That is why a project was worked out in 1989 to temporarily store them for a period of 40 years in a central repository on Czechoslovak territory. This elegant solution was really worthy of the past regime—solving the question of permanent storage and of its financing was left to our grandchildren. [passage omitted]

At the beginning of this year, on the initiative of the Ministry of Environment, the search for the most suitable [permanent] storage area started on the territory of the Czech Republic. [passage omitted]

Government Data on Economic Development Reported

AU1004113491 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 5 Apr 91 pp 1,2

[Zbynek Fiala report: "The Koruna Is Holding Ground; Figures from a Federal Government Report"]

[Excerpt] The most interesting item of yesterday's news conference held after the Federal Government session—at which, quite exceptionally, Federal Government Press Spokeswoman Nada Petrova and her assistant were the only ones to attend—was a report on the economic situation in the CSFR and the economic policy of the Federal Government, copies of which were being distributed right at the entrance.

It is the same document that is currently being debated in the Federal Assembly committees. We have selected from it some lesser known data:

As of 15 March, the balance of payments showed a deficit of approximately $250 million, which is a far more favorable result than had been expected. At the same time, this result shows that the system of the koruna's internal convertibility has been applied successfully thus far.

The foreign trade deficit, on the other hand, looks dramatic. According to preliminary estimates, exports in January and February represented only 80 percent of last year's volume. No goods at all were sold to the Soviet Union for freely convertible currencies until 15 February.

Data on the participation of foreign capital shows that 2,500 enterprises with foreign capital participation operate in our country with a total capital of 16 billion korunas, of which foreign capital accounts for 50 percent. There are 12 [partly foreign-owned] enterprises whose basic capital exceeds 100 million korunas and three enterprises whose basic capital exceeds 1 billion korunas. [passage omitted]

Struggle for Ownership of Newspaper Continues

AU1004123691

[Editorial Report] Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 4, 5,

and 6 April publishes a number of items related to the conflict over ownership of the newspaper, which declared its independence from its publisher, the Czech Ministry of Agriculture, and changed its name earlier this month. Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech on 6 April carries a 200-word CTK report on a news conference with Petr Schoenfeld, chief editor of CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY, held on 5 April.

Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 4 April on pages 1 and 2 carries a 1,600-word "zn"-signed survey, entitled "An Unnecessarily Escalated Conflict," reviewing the latest development of events in the "continuing struggle for ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY." The item first cites interviews given by Czech Minister of Agriculture Bohumil Kubat and Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart to CTK on the conflict.

In his statement for CTK, Minister Kubat accuses the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY editorial staff of having committed an "economic fraud." As Kubat points out, "Petr Schoenfeld, director of what has until now been the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY state enterprise, has transferred all rights to a private shareholding company and, thereby, has virtually rendered the activity of the state enterprise impossible."

In the interview, Kubat also denies allegations that the Czechoslovak People's Party (CSL) has been trying to influence the future of the publication of ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY. He notes that "the question of whether the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY state enterprise will continue publishing a [rival] newspaper" has not yet been decided.

A different view is expressed by Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart. In his interview for CTK, Pithart concedes that the Czech Ministry of Agriculture is the founder and, hence, the owner of ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY. He adds, however, that this is actually "a relic of the past" and that the ministry should respect the wish of the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY editorial staff as to "where and under what conditions it wishes to work."

Asked by CTK whether he is able to confirm Minister Kubat's words that the CSL has not been trying to exert its influence on ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY, Pithart says that, although he does not avail himself of any specific evidence, the fact is that "every political party has the natural tendency to influence a newspaper that is as popular and as widely read as ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY."

The summary of Kubat's and Pithart's interviews for CTK is followed by an account of an undated interview that the two men gave to Czechoslovak Television. In the interview for Czechoslovak Television, Kubat and Pithart restate their known positions. While Kubat insists on the right of the Ministry of Agriculture as the publisher of ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY to "truthfully inform the countryside and farmers" and to publish for them "a newspaper within the framework of the Ministry of Agriculture," Prime Minister Pithart believes that individual ministries should not have their own dailies and that what the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY staff did was "quite natural" and "should not be resisted."

The account of Kubat's and Pithart's television interview is followed by a 300-word statement by the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY editorial staff, which challenges Minister Kubat's claim that the CSL did not play any role in the conflict over the publication of ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY. As the statement points out, both the new director of the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY state enterprise whom Kubat appointed and Kubat's candidate for the post of ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY chief editor are "linked with the CSL." Moreover, the talks on the publication of a rival ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY take place on the premises of the CSL daily LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE, a fact that cannot be regarded as "accidental."

Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 5 April on page 1 carries a 300-word statement by the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY editorial staff on talks between representatives of the Czech Ministry of Agriculture and the newly set up ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY shareholding company held on 4 April. According to the statement, the talks were broken off without any agreement being reached, which means that "the question of whether the idea of a free and independent newspaper will prevail, or the idea of a newspaper that is controlled and influenced by the ministry, remains open."

On the same page, the newspaper carries a 400-word interview with Prime Minister Marian Calfa on the conflict over the ownership of ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY. In the interview, which was conducted on 4 April, Calfa expresses support for the stand of the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY staff in the conflict. He criticizes Czech Minister of Agriculture Kubat for using "anachronistic legal norms to assert the will of the state" and for resorting to "practices, from which we ought to be spared." Calfa finds Kubat's attitude "hard to explain at a time when we are so sensitive to any expression restricting press freedom and the flow of information."

On the same page, ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY also carries the following CTK report: "Czech Government Press Spokesman Petr Prihoda announced in connection with the situation in ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY that Prime Minister Petr Pithart is against any administrative intervention either in favor of or opposed to either side [in the conflict]. Prime Minister Pithart received the assurance from Minister Kubat that he would assume the same position."

On 5 and 6 April, on page 1 in each instance, the newspaper publishes statements on the conflict by Czech and Slovak politicians, including Federal Assembly Chairman Alexander Dubcek and CSFR Deputy Prime

Minister Rychetsky. All of them express support for the independence of the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY staff.

The SVOBODNE SLOVO report on Petr Schoenfeld's news conference quotes the chief editor as saying that "two different ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY are likely to be published today—one published by the state enterprise of the same name and CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY, whose publisher is the First ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY shareholding company." Schoenfeld adds that both organizations have concluded contracts with a printing plant in Prague, but only the First ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY shareholding company has a contract with a printing plant in Brno. It could thus happen that "the 'ministerial' ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY will be available in Prague and the Czech lands, while the daily published by the shareholding company will be available in Moravia and Silesia."

RUDE PRAVO Wants To Stay Independent

AU1004164991 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 3 Apr 91 p 2

[Editorial staff statement: "RUDE PRAVO Will Stay Independent"]

[Text] Some time ago, Jiri Svoboda, Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] chairman, submitted some kind of basic documents representing draft principles for the conclusion of an agreement on cooperation between our paper and the KSCM. In 11 points he presented a collection of suggestions or—rather—demands, which, if met, would even lead to stopping the KSCM's preparations for publishing its own daily. After an extensive discussion, our editorial staff adopted a joint standpoint addressed to the KSCM Central Committee Executive Committee. It says:

We appreciate that you view RUDE PRAVO as a paper independent of all political entities, including the KSCM. A correct arrangement for mutual relations must be based on the recognition of independence and the creative freedom of journalists. The editorial staff of the leftist paper RUDE PRAVO wants to report about and freely comment on KSCM activity—as it does in the case of other parties—on a scope that corresponds to the KSCM's position in political life.

This is, in our opinion, the only possible basis for relations between a political party and an independent paper. We are not avoiding dialogue and mutually informative meetings, yet we cannot return to old models of relations between a political party and the press, in which a paper was alternatively perceived either as a bulletin or as a servant. If the KSCM wants to have such a paper, then it will have to establish it from the contributions of its members. In our opinion, such a newspaper cannot compete on the free market without subsidies amounting to millions from the party's coffers.

For these reasons we cannot accept the set of proposals presented, since this would mean that RUDE PRAVO would return to exactly the type of party paper that we refuse to produce.

We are willing, based on equality, to hold discussions with every political entity. We want to write and to comment truthfully, and for this we need working contacts with all political parties of greater importance. The KSCM belongs to them, and we are not avoiding mutual relations. However, these relations must not be interpreted as a means of limiting the degree of the paper's independence and as a tool for asserting the party's influence on the work of the editorial staff.

Minister Confirms Talks on Arms Held in Moscow

AU1004125491

[Editorial Report] Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 6 April on page 2 carries a 350-word "gal"-signed report on a news conference with Slovak Minister of Industry Jozef Belcak, devoted to the problems of conversion in Slovakia, held in Bratislava on 5 April. The report, which is otherwise covered by the first referent item, contains the following passage in which Belcak responds to a question about alleged "secret" talks held by a Slovak Government delegation in Moscow: "I do not know anything about any 'secret' talks. Outside the scheduled program of the visit, I had consultations at the [Soviet] Ministry of Foreign Trade where I spoke with the Soviet partners about licenses and about the possibilities of marketing there the DV 2 aircraft engine, which is manufactured in Slovakia. We agreed that as far as products that are blocked in some way on the basis of international agreements are concerned, the Soviet side will be willing to abolish licenses at our request. This only concerns the aforementioned aircraft engine."

Slovak Government Discusses Energy, Dam Project

AU1004133191 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 5 Apr 91 pp 1, 2

[A. Melicharkova report: "Variant T—Talks: Slovak Government on Energy Policy"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—The Slovak Government returned several of the documents that were discussed to be reworked or disagreed with them because they are "not ripe" or do not comply with the division of powers—the latter was said about some proposals and measures by the federal bodies.

As early as during the news briefing in the lobby, we learned that the government rejected the proposal on measures guaranteeing the existence of the production cooperatives of the handicapped in Slovakia. According to Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, the entire list of questions was badly prepared. The government asked

that the pertinent ministers cooperate with the chairman of the Union of Production Cooperatives and other concerned ministers in further elaboration of the proposal. V. Meciar also commented on the new attack by the Hungarian press aimed at the Gabcikovo project. He said that variant C, approved by the Slovak Government some time ago, is only supposed to investigate the possibilities of completing the work. No construction work is taking place on the site; however, intensive work is being done on the T variant [reference to future talks with the Hungarian Government]: "I should conduct talks with the Hungarian Government this month," he emphasized.

The first document to be adopted was the bill on association in political parties. The prime minister told journalists that there were 21 suggestions to improve the bill, and another ten were added by the Slovak Government. [passage omitted]

I. Tirpak, minister-chairman of the Slovak Commission for the Environment, informed [the journalists] in detail about the negative stance of the Slovak Government regarding the bill on protecting the air against pollutants that was submitted by the appropriate federal committee. The reasons for the rejection were that some correlations were not dealt with and the division of powers was disregarded. In connection with the next item on the agenda—providing protection for citizens and for the economy in the event of a radiation accident in nuclear plants—the Slovak Government appointed this minister the chairman of the Slovak Government Commission for the Coordination of Radiation-Disaster Measures and assigned him the task of setting up a coordination group composed of deputy ministers of the interested ministries. In this context, I. Tirpak told journalists that as soon as Monday [8 April], a control group from the International Union for Atomic Energy will come to the CSFR, and he must call a meeting of this coordination group prior to that time.

Issues other that those related to the government session were also discussed at yesterday's meeting with the press. In connection with the cancellation of the promised meeting of President Havel with the Slovak political representation, V. Meciar pointed out that the political issues in Slovakia are "our business and we alone have to deal with them." Asked about Minister L. Kosta's voting in the Slovak National Council for himself as well as for two others, he said that he feels bad about it.

The Slovak Government recalled M. Seeman from his post as Slovak deputy minister of justice because of his retirement and appointed S. Kohut to this post. Because of unsatisfactory work, it recalled J. Remis, deputy minister of forestry, water economy, and the wood-processing industry. It acknowledged information on the appointment of 24 Slovak university professors.

Minister Knazko Comments on Havel, Federation

AU1004165991 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 5 Apr 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Slovak International Relations Minister Milan Knazko by Miroslav Valka; place and date not given: "In the Dock?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Valka] Mr. Knazko, many citizens cannot accept the argument that the president should not have appeared in the Slovak National Square [in Bratislava on 14 March while a demonstration of Slovak separatists was in progress].

[Knazko] Yes, but should they not accept the argument that even the Slovak interior minister did not know that the president would come to the Slovak National Uprising Square? Can you imagine what could have happened? Indeed, this manifestation was directed against the federation and also against the head of state. Extremist groups were involved. Was it responsible? Do you know what kind of light this has thrown on the whole of Slovakia?

[Valka] Do you want to say that what Vaclav Havel did was politically irresponsible?

[Knazko] Unfortunately, yes, I do.

[Valka] Two federal ministers, the Slovaks Baksay and Miklosko, presented an apology to the president for what had happened....

[Knazko] We do not want to follow up on the traditions of the Slovak state, which was established in the known historical context and which was negatively marked by this context. The Slovak Government and the Slovak National Council, too, have presented official apologies for some of their political attitudes, but am I to be ashamed for a state that ceased to exist in the year in which I was born? Am I to be ashamed for an isolated demonstration by a small group of little importance? Am I to be ashamed for a demonstration that I oppose, which I have not initiated, and in which I have not participated? Are we supposed to succumb to a collective shame?

[Valka] Mr. Knazko, I have the feeling that you do not understand Vaclav Havel in some matters any longer and vice versa.

[Knazko] I have the impression that, to a certain degree, this is true. For example, I do not understand why Vaclav Havel has repeated so many times that he would not allow a solution to the Slovak political situation by means of military intervention. I do not know about anyone having asked for or proposed such a solution. I must also say that the situation in Slovakia is not as dramatic as it appears from similar assurances. I do not understand why Vaclav Havel sees the situation that black and why he himself sometimes contributes to such judgment. I do not even understand why he, in his concept of the constitution, demands that the individual

republics have no right to secede from the federation; and, at the same time, indeed, he talks to us from the television screen (during his recent visit to Bratislava) wishing Slovakia the right to decide whether to claim the right to self-determination. It is generally true that things are being too dramatized in this sensitive period of mistrust, irrational bogeys are painted on the wall, and arguments are presented in an unbusinesslike manner. [passage omitted]

[Valka] Irrespective of all you have said, do you still regard it as an honor to be Vaclav Havel's friend?

[Knazko] I consider him to be my friend. Political opinions should not disrupt friendship, but they should teach both sides to listen to one another. [passage omitted]

[Valka] I would like to verbatim quote a rather extensive passage from the For Democratic Slovakia platform declaration. "Let us not waste our opportunity by taking hasty steps and by being excessively impatient, which would complicate the establishment of a sovereign, autonomous, and democratic Slovak Republic, and let us realize that, at the present time, the optimal way toward it is the federation as we understand it." Mr. Knazko, can this be understood to mean that you are for a federation now but for a Slovak state later?

[Knazko] This passage seems unclear to me. You are right in that it can make someone feel as if the platform's future line was only a trick. I, speaking for myself, can say that I will not be part of making tricks in politics. If our platform says that it favors coexistence with the Czech Republic, then it really is the case. The Slovak side is sincerely interested in arranging our coexistence in such a manner that this coexistence becomes permanent and stable.

[Valka] Do you think that our coexistence should be decided by a referendum?

[Knazko] I believe that nothing would be solved by a referendum. The majority of Slovaks want a common state. The issue is, how the common state should be arranged. [passage omitted]

[Valka] Recently, voices were heard that, if need be, Slovak working people would be willing to show their strength. This is quite misleading and dangerous for a parliamentary democracy. "The strength of the working people" is something that we had here before.

[Valka] It makes a difference whether resolutions are compiled in party secretariats or whether they are born of the completely free will of the people. This phenomenon of the present times bears out that citizens are looking for ways to influence the deputies they have elected and to show them that they should be interested in the opinion of their voters. This does not seem undemocratic to me. [passage omitted]

Slovaks Accused of Breaking Constitution Agreement

AU1004172591 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 6 Apr 91 p 2

["ij"-signed report: "A Cool Trick"]

[Text] Prague— Jan Filip, an expert from the Brno Law School, yesterday informed members of the Czech National Council subcommission for the drafting of the Czech Republic constitution that five different drafts of a Slovak Republic constitution have been worked out in Slovakia. The draft of the Slovak National Party proceeds from the principle of an independent Slovak state; the Freedom Party proposes a Czech-Slovak confederation; the Christian Democratic Movement's draft provides for the conclusion of a state treaty between two or, alternatively, three state formations; and the draft of the [Public Against Violence movement's] For a Democratic Slovakia platform reckons with the founding of a union-type [spolkovy] state. Only the draft of the Slovak National Council respects the existing federation. According to J. Filip, it is assumed that the new Slovak Republic constitution will be based on the draft containing the largest number of elements that are common to all five drafts. According to J. Filip, the Slovak National Council intends to approve the constitution by the end of June. The Slovak political representatives apparently assume that thereby they would force the Czech National Council to approve the Czech Republic constitution during the summer. If this really happened, the CSFR Constitution, which the Federal Assembly will approve only on 28 October 1991, would have to be based on the already approved constitutions of the two republics, which would confirm the principle of sovereign republics and a derived federation. This represents an apparent attempt at violating the political agreement that the federal constitution and the constitutions of the republic would be drafted in parallel.

J. Filip also told the deputies that the Moravian National Party and the Moravian Civic Movement are working on their own versions of the Czech Republic constitution, independently of the Czech National Council.

Asked by our reporter how quickly the preparation of the constitution in the Czech National Council proceeds and when the draft would be presented to deputies for approval, Jiri Payne (Civic Forum), who heads the subcommission, said that the preparation of the Czech Republic constitution proceeds slowly and that it is impossible as yet to estimate when the draft will be ready.

Meciar Receives Declaration on State Sovereignty

LD1004161291 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1000 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar received a delegation of representatives of national

movements early today. They presented to him a declaration on the state sovereignty of Slovakia. After a short conversation with authors of the declaration, (Bohuslav Piatko) addressed the prime minister:

[Begin recording] [(Piatko)] The Slovak Prime Minister and his attitude toward the declaration, and the Slovak Prime Minister and his attitude toward (?sovereignty)... [sentence as heard]

[Meciar] Having examined the material submitted to me by representatives of various movements of national character, we started a broad discussion. The discussion concerned our own problems: the need to unite, in our own country, the view on resolving Slovak policy in relation to the completion of the constitutional state development of the Slovak Republic; the definition of the joint state of Czechs and Slovaks; and also aspects of broader European integration interests. [passage omitted] I think that the development in Slovakia will culminate with the adoption of our constitution: There are several variants. A political method of talks, adoption, and assessment, however, has to be adopted. The completion of the development of the Slovak Republic—the constitutional form of the state—is an historic task. We are responsible for it, and we have to fulfil it. We would never be able to explain to future generations why we could not manage it.

[(Piatko)] What role can this declaration play at present?

[Meciar] The declaration can be a catalyst, but any decision has to come in the form of a constitutional decision of the Slovak National Council. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Slovakia's Meciar Challenges Rychetsky's Statement

AU1004173691 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Apr 91 pp 1, 2

[CTK report, followed by an "fe"-signed report: "The Economy Poses a Threat to the Federation; P. Rychetsky Casts Doubt on the Slovak Government"]

[Excerpts] Prague— "It seems that the fate of the common home of Czechs and Slovaks continues to be threatened," Deputy Prime Minister P. Rychetsky stated at a news conference given by the Civic Movement in Prague yesterday.

In his opinion, the threat to the federation does not come only from the crisis in Slovakia but, in particular, from the fact that Slovakia is both psychologically and structurally unprepared for a vigorous economic reform. [passage omitted]

P. Rychetsky declared, furthermore, that "the Slovak Government has stopped functioning as a government." Explaining this statement, he added that several members of the Slovak Government (whom he refused to name) had informed him, at meetings of the Federal Government and on the occasion of other talks, that the situation in the Slovak Government does not permit its smooth operation. He observed that cooperation between the Federal Government and the Slovak Government does not have the dynamism it used to have. [passage omitted]

After his return from the Federal Assembly meeting three minutes before 2200 yesterday, we asked Slovak Prime Minister Meciar whether he shares the view that the Slovak Government has stopped functioning. "Could you tell me when Mr. Rychetsky last attended a Slovak Government session?," the prime minister asked. "I do not know where he gets his information from. One thing is certain, however: All the efforts to cast doubt on the activity of the Slovak Republic Government are being made with 24 April in mind, when a plenary meeting of the Slovak National Council is to discuss the results of investigations into my work in the posts of minister of interior and prime minister. Certain circles content themselves even with such methods in pursuit of this goal [the passing of a vote of no confidence in Meciar at the 24 April meeting of the Slovak National Council]. Mr. Rychetsky is wrong. The government is working, and all the ministers deserve credit for it. I am dissatisfied only with the work of three members of the government, none of whom is a minister.

Ministry Accused of Damaging Slovak Economy

AU1004191191 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Apr 91 p 13

[Article by Slovak Industry Industry Jan Holcik: "Can One Engage in Trade Like This?"—reprinted from CAS, daily of the Democratic Party, No. 80/1991]

[Text] The premature death of Foreign Trade Minister Stracar has thrown back the entire management of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade. The ministry's new leadership has returned to the old practices. The following case illustrates how much damage red-tapism and bureaucracy (or was it intentional?) can cause.

In the summer of 1990, in view of reduced Soviet crude oil deliveries, the crisis staff of the CSFR Ministry of Economy headed by Minister V. Dlouhy issued decree No. 391/1990 banning the export of crude oil products from the CSFR. Since the beginning of 1991, however, crude oil supplies have been developing favorably. There is plenty of crude oil; our refineries are working and producing all the badly needed oil and petrochemical products. The Slovnaft Bratislava state enterprise purchased with its own funds (that is, not from federal funds!) $40 million worth of crude oil. It did so through the Japanese C-ITOH company under favorable terms of payment. The whole transaction was mediated by the Petrimex foreign trade shareholding company. It is self-evident that products acquired from the processing of

this crude oil must be reexported to acquire new sources of money because money breeds new money.

In view of the abundance of diesel oil and heating oil on the home market, the Slovnaft state enterprise advanced the offer to Petrimex to export 15,000 tonnes of diesel oil and 20,000 tonnes of heating oil. A contract with a foreign customer at the then valid prices was prepared, which was very favorable for our side. The aforementioned Decree No. 391/1990, which bans exports of oil-based products, prevented customs from authorizing the export, however. The full tow boats of Czechoslovak Danube Navigation Lines and tanker trains had to wait. The Slovak Ministry of Industry and the minister personally intervened with Federal Minister of Foreign Trade Baksay and Federal Minister of Economy Dlouhy. They informed the Secretariat of CSFR Deputy Prime Minister Vales about their request for the immediate abolition of the above decree. The bureaucracy claimed its toll, however. It took three weeks for an "exception" to be granted for the export of 50,000 tonnes of oil-based products. Nota bene: This was for the export of products made of oil that had been purchased by "nonfederal" money!!!

In the meantime, while the "exception" to, or abolition of, Decree No. 391/1990 were being considered, which rendered a prompt export impossible, the prices of products that we offered fell sharply. In the end, the transaction with the foreign partner was implemented at a loss of 22.62 million korunas. Needless to say, the loss was incurred by Slovak enterprises—the Slovnaft state enterprise and the Petrimex foreign trade enterprise—but also by the budget of the Slovak Republic. This case furnishes evidence of the untenable situation in our foreign trade and its policy, which is controlled from the center by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Slovak Official on Armament Industry Conversion

LD1004193891 Prague CTK in English 1728 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Bratislava April 10 (CTK)—Slovak Deputy Premier Vladimir Ondrus stressed today the need for a speedy decision on which arms production equipment would be conserved and which weapons could still be sold under relatively advantageous conditions.

Ondrus, who also chairs the Slovak Government Council for Economic Management, said in an interview for CTK that arms industries must be effectively converted to prevent mass unemployment which threatens in particular north and central Slovak regions. Conversion affects both direct arms manufacturers and over 60 other Slovak plants which supplied them, Ondrus said.

He said these questions are expected to be discussed, at the federal level this month, and added that the establishment of a consolidation bank, which would grant credits to armaments factories for unmarketable stocks, is being prepared in Slovakia.

Ondrus stated that Czechoslovak armaments plants are owed 20,000 million U.S. dollars for their supplies to foreign purchasers.

Carnogursky on Situation of Slovaks Abroad

AU1004194891 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Apr 91 p 2

[CTK report: "They Are Not a Dry Branch: J. Carnogursky on His Visit to Ethnic Slovaks"]

[Text] Bratislava— "It was only during this trip that I realized that, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the so-called lower country [term referring to Hungary south of the Danube prior to 1918] had very compact and numerous Slovak settlements. After World War I, these settlement found themselves in Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia," First Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky told CTK in connection with the just-concluded working visit by a Slovak Government delegation to these three countries. He said that these Slovak communities have retained their national identity and, to a large degree, also their language. They regard themselves as Slovaks and at the same time are loyal to the countries in which they live. Asked in which of the three countries that he visited Slovaks enjoy the best conditions for their national life, J. Carnogursky said: "I believe that the best conditions exist in Yugoslavia, where the Slovaks are also the nationally most aware and most self-confident in a positive sense of the word. I learned that they also endured the greatest sacrifices in the resistance movement during World War II when one in five Slovaks in Yugoslavia died.

"In contrast to Yugoslavia," he said, "Slovaks living in Hungary have no representation in the legislature and are under strong psychological pressure from Hungarian culture." It needs to be said, however, that the present Hungarian Government supports the Slovak minority. Assistance from the Slovak Government, too, would be welcome. There are eight teachers from Slovakia in elementary schools. There is also interest in Slovak priests, the first of whom should come to the Hungarian Republic in a few weeks. The establishment of a [Slovak] cultural and social center is planned, most probably at Bekescsaba. The Slovak community in Hungary would benefit from the opportunity of watching the programs of Slovak Television. The technical and financial aspects of the construction of a transmitter will have to be considered.

"Slovaks living in Hungary loathe being referred to by our press as some sort of a cut off root or dry branch only because—in contrast to some local organizations of the Slovak National Heritage Foundation in southern Slovakia—they do not assume militant anti-Hungarian positions. They know best how to live together with other residents and in which ways the Slovak Government can

support them. It is not for us to teach them how to behave and how to be Slovak patriots," J. Carnogursky stressed.

"The situation of Slovaks in Romania has improved after Ceausescu's fall. They can develop what is their own, Slovak. They are represented in the Federal Assembly, and they have established their own organization, the Democratic Union of Slovaks and Czechs, based at Nadlak." J. Carnogursky went on to express appreciation for the recent assistance that was extended by various organizations to our compatriots in Romania in the form of books, clothing, printing plant equipment, etc. The Slovak Government intends to expand assistance to Slovak minorities abroad, especially in the form of scholarships.

The first Slovak deputy prime minister also expressed his opinion on the collective rights of national minorities. "I realize the fact that, thus far, collective rights of minorities have not gained recognition in international, European law. Some states, such as Yugoslavia, recognize them. Serbia has enshrined them in its constitution. Hungarian diplomacy, on the other hand, campaigns for these sort of rights. If Hungary recognized the collective rights of the Slovak minority, it [the Slovak minority] would have to have its own representation in the Hungarian National Assembly. The Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic has its schools, which are financed by the state, and it is represented in parliament through its political parties. I therefore believe that, without calling them collective rights, many of their elements are being exercised in our country."

Controversy Surrounds Ambassador to United States

Zwack Calls For Jeszenszky's Resignation

AU1104094591 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 8 Apr 91 p 1

[Eva Molnar report: "Peter Zwack Demands Jeszenszky's Resignation"]

[Text] On 2 April 1991, Laszlo Varkonyi, head of the American Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, came to the Hungarian Embassy in Washington to hand over a "nice discharge message" to Ambassador Peter Zwack on behalf of Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky. Peter Zwack only added that his departure was because of "irreconcilable political conflicts."

Perhaps he would not have said even that much until the end of July—because both sides had agreed to keep silent about the affair until then—if Jeszenszky had not made negative statements about Peter Zwack's ability as ambassador.

What happened in Washington and especially in Budapest from Peter Zwack's viewpoint?

The Zwack family arrived in Washington in September 1990. "If I ever made a mistake, it was then"—Peter Zwack said—"because, having no previous diplomatic experience, I did not know the importance of the second man in the embassy. His task is to manage the embassy and to assist the ambassador by taking over the everyday administrative tasks, so the ambassador can fully concentrate on representing his country. This position was filled then by the highly experienced diplomat Istvan Pataki; however, Geza Jeszenszky and State Secretary Kodolanyi told me that Pataki was the old regime's man and had to go. Instead, they forced Eniko Bollobas on me."

According to Peter Zwack, he did not know that Jeszenszky, Kodolanyi, and Bollobas were members of the same clique of friends. Nor did Peter Zwack think that the embassy would be put in charge of Pataki, who was called a communist. Peter Zwack did consider the fact that the Hungarian Embassy would not function smoothly with two inexperienced administrators. This fear became a reality. Reports were not prepared as precisely and timely as in Pataki's time; however Peter Zwack did not bother about this. He was interested in making Hungary as successful and attractive as possible in the U.S. political and economic circles. According to Peter Zwack, he did not know that an "MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] party commissar" was forced upon him in the person of Eniko Bollobas."

Bollobas immediately quarreled with Commercial Attache Istvan Mohacsi, one of the three experienced men who stayed on. The other two are Press Attache Gabor Szentivanyi and Cultural Attache Bela Szombati. Peter Zwack highly appreciates all three of these young diplomats. According to Peter Zwack, he understood that, at the time, these people had to be party members to advance, and he knew that all three people were excellent professionals. As a result, he interfered and prevented a serious quarrel developing between Bollobas and Mohacsi at the embassy. According to Peter Zwack, this was the moment when Bollobas turned against him.

According to Peter Zwack, it soon became clear that the Hungarian Government wanted to see an MDF-party embassy in Washington, and so did Eniko Bollobas. Peter Zwack wanted to represent Hungary, both the governing party and the opposition alike, because he felt the Hungarian Embassy belonged to everyone. The embassy should serve the interests of the whole country, and not only the interests of one group. "As a Hungarian citizen, therefore, I demand the resignation of Geza Jeszenszky, who disc.edited himself and ridiculed himself in the United States."

Zwack Said To Lack 'Preparedness'

LD1004205391 Budapest MTI in English 1829 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 10 (MTI)—The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian parliament decided that a hearing of Hungarian Ambassador to Washington Peter Zwack was unecessary, though the ambassador, who had recently been recalled, was intent on giving an account of events in the Hungarian Embassy in Washington.

Following his discharge, the ambassador called upon Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky to resign. According to statements of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry's leading officials, however, Zwack lacks the preparedness necessary for his post.

Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee decided to put the issue of Hungary's foreign representations on their agenda before the summer recess and to discuss the activities of ambassadors and embassy officials.

At the session of the Foreign Affairs Committee, State Secretary Tamas Katona promised that the Foreign Ministry would revise its personnel policy in future, and would fill the leading posts of foreign representations only with diplomats who are properly trained and prepared.

Speaking about the events at the Washington embassy, Katona said that after the immediate discharge of Peter Zwack, the post of Hungary's ambassador in Washington would probably remain vacant until midsummer.

Zwack Comments on Dismissal

LD1104081891 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0500 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Interview with Peter Zwack, dismissed ambassador to the United States, by New York reporter Gyorgy Bolgar; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Bolgar] First of all, in what capacity are you making the statement?

[Zwack] Most definitely as a private individual.

[Bolgar] Did this development come as a surprise?

[Zwack] Let us say, the speed of it, yes; but the whole did not surprise me. When I attacked [Foreign Minister] Jeszenszky, I did realize it would end like this. I even understand it; I understand that an ambassador cannot attack his minister without consequences.

[Bolgar] The National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee decided not give you a hearing, although you would have liked to give your own version.

[Zwack] I am surprised at this, in fact, because if someone asks to be heard in a democracy, this request is ususlly granted.

[Bolgar] Would you have had something to say, which you had been reserving for them?

[Zwack] Yes, there are still a few things, which I did not want to make public at the time, because they are state secrets.

[Bolgar] What will happen to these if you cannot present them to the Foreign Affairs Committee? Where can you disclose them?

[Zwack] I will keep them to myself.

[Bolgar] Finally, I have a practical question: You have to return within 48 hours. How can you be ready in 48 hours?

[Zwack] I did ask for an extension, because this is impossible. There is no question of me being able to return home in 48 hours.

Antall on Government's Year, 'Zwack Affair'

LD1004164391 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Janos Hollos report on news conference by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall with unidentified reporters; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Prime Minister Jozsef Antall has spoken about the year-old work of the government at a news conference, during which he made references to the Zwack affair.

[Antall] I think that—if you like, colored by episodes and scandals—the year has proved nonetheless that in Hungary, both the economy and the political structure are viable, and I state even now that in Hungary we cannot speak of a global crisis.

[Hollos] The Zwack affair was also raised at the news conference—the view of the prime minister about the release of the Hungarian ambassador to Washington.

[Antall] I can only answer your question with a question: Do you know such a precedent in history in which an ambassador calls on his own minister of foreign affairs to resign and then continues his work?

[Hollos] Many of those present viewed the answer by Jozsef Antall as aying that the government statement to be issued tomorrow would contain the replacement of Peter Zwack.

Six Deputies View First Year of Democracy

AU1004185591 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 6 Apr 91 p 6

[Interviews with Ferenc Kulin, Janos Kis, Miklos Omolnar, Imre Szekeres, Tibor Fuzessy, and Viktor Orban, representatives from six parliamentary parties, by Laszlo Nagy Csaszar; place and date not given: "This Was the Year!"—first paragraph is MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Excerpts] One year after the free elections that heralded Hungary's change of regime, we asked six leading figures from our parliamentary parties to answer the following questions:

1. To what extent have you been able to fulfill the promises made in 1990?
2. Do you consider our political system of institutions to be stable?
3. Which tendencies do you think will grow, and what fears do you have for the year to come?

[Kulin, Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)] 1. If we look at the details of our program, then we have to admit that we have achieved very little within the course of a year. Let us take the example of our economy: Despite a few encouraging tendencies in certain important areas, there has been no decisive change to mark our transition to a market economy. Our domestic and external public debt has continued to grow, there has been no structural change in our industry, we have not been able to significantly reduce our inflation rates, and—our most serious problem—we have not been able to prevent a drop in our living standards. [passage omitted]

Despite all that, I think we are on the right track. We might be mistaken or slow in many areas, but even a perfect political leadership could not have achieved much more in a year, and we never promised to build new structures to replace the old ones within that period of time. [passage omitted]

2. I think that the parliamentary party structure that developed after the spring 1990 elections will stand the test of time. By that, I do not mean that the current power relations will necessarily remain the same over a long period of time; I simply mean that eventual restructurings will not automatically necessitate early elections. [passage omitted]

The survival of the current coalition's form and lineup will depend on whether we succeed in creating a new kind of unity—uniting both internal MDF tendencies, as well as the MDF and its coalition partners. [passage omitted]

3. I see the government's three-year economic program as encouraging and feasible, and I realistically think that within the course of this year, we will be able to pass the most important laws that would guarantee the legal framework for our change of regime. [passage omitted]

[Janos Kis, Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)] 1. In a parliamentary democracy, opposition parties have to realize that they do not play a determining role in decisions on fundamental issues. That is why we should not be surprised that the SZDSZ only achieved results in matters of detail that did not affect the general orientation of parliamentary bills. [passage omitted]

2. There can be no alternative to parliamentary democracy. When we speak of a crisis, we have to bear in mind that post-Communist regimes are not solid anywhere, and in general, they are dealing with more serious problems than ours. [passage omitted]

3. I agree with those who regard the paralysis of public administration as one of the dangerous trends of the coming period. This is partly due to the fact that our legislative work is too slow. We must put things in order in this area, so we may avoid a total collapse. If we succeed in solving this problem, I think that we will be able to solve the tasks facing us, despite a deterioration in our living conditions. [passage omitted]

[Miklos Omolnar, Independent Smallholders' Party (FKgP)] 1. I see our greatest achievement in the fact that the FKgP started politicizing with accountable means in January 1991. Putting it in the finest possible terms, the activities that went on before January can best be described as camarilla-politics, given that, on the whole, no minutes were taken of coalition negotiations, and even our fundamental coalition agreement only appeared in the form of a collection of slogans, with some 10 or 12 sentences. [passage omitted]

2. The stability of our system of political institutions is relative. If we look around at other ex-socialist countries, then we have little to worry about. If we base ourselves on the criteria of a well-functioning parliamentary democracy, however, then Hungary is facing serious problems. [passage omitted]

The current political parties can only be considered as party initiatives, borne out of a historical vacuum. A great number of small intellectual groups have grown into parties, and they are now desperately trying to grow some roots, to become real parties; that is why they are looking for social strata that they could take on. [passage omitted]

3. In the end, I do not think that six-party coordination talks could represent a solution to the partial malfunctioning of Hungarian politics. Those who believe that such talks would represent the continuation of former roundtable negotiations are mistaken. [passage omitted]

[Imre Szekeres, Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)] 1. I am pleased that we succeeded in carrying out a peaceful transition: That was an excellent achievement by this country. Credit is not due to our political parties, but primarily to society. It is worrisome, however, to observe the time wasted by parliamentarians on the discussion on pseudo-problems; these discussions impeded an already initiated process. I think that our party has been the least guilty of this offense. [passage omitted]

2. I think that the framework of our system of political institutions is stable, because our institutions did not appear out of the blue within the framework of the constitutional work carried out in 1989 and 1990; our institutions are the fruit of years and decades of in-depth research work. It may well be that, sooner or later, Hungary's suffrage law or Constitution will need to be reformed, but our parliamentarism is lasting. [passage omitted]

3. As far as future trends are concerned, the decisive factor will be the extent to which we succeed in politically consolidating our political situation. If we fail to obtain consolidation, then a deterioration in our living conditions and the initiatives of extremist political forces may lead to unstable tendencies that could shake the very foundations of the framework of our system of institutions. I do not think there is a great danger of such developments, however, because society is handling the current period—learning about the road that leads to real democracy—much better than some eminent actors on our political scene. [passage omitted]

[Tibor Fuzessy, Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)] 1. We were given the Ministry for People's Welfare, and this enabled us to achieve as much as possible to elaborate a social safety net which we take very seriously. [passage omitted]

Many people say that our parliamentary behavior is low-key, but this has been a conscious effort on our part. We are trying to avoid fierce debates and unnecessary personal remarks. [passage omitted]

2. It can be said that our system of political institutions is stable—I am referring to both the National Assembly and the government. The government is assessed by many people in many different ways, but the pact between the two largest parties is definitely an important element in the stability of our institutions. [passage omitted]

3. The currently planned six-party negotiations can only be successful if the government and the opposition are able to agree on the order of importance of the issues that will be on the agenda. If there is no agreement on the order of importance, then these talks will only serve to increase the number of existing forums. [passage omitted]

[Viktor Orban, Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ)] 1. I should be exuberant because there has been a visible increase in the grass roots, popularity, and

intellectual influence of the FIDESZ, but we have to bear in mind that the FIDESZ only has 22 parliamentary mandates, and in a National Assemnbly with 390 delegates, we cannot achieve miracles. Nevertheless, from a statistical point of view, our balance is still positive because the National Assembly accepted our every sixth motion—moreover, during its constitutional modifications, the National Assembly accepted our every fifth motion. [passage omitted]

2. As far as Hungary's system of institutions is concerned, I think we achieved as much as we could possibly achieve within the course of a year. There is only one omission in our system of institutions, and that is in the area of our trade unions; trade unions do not, strictly speaking, form part of a system of political institutions, but they are linked to that system. [passage omitted]

The experience of this past year shows us that the National Assembly has to remain unicameral; however, the number of parliamentary representatives should be limited to approximately 200. This is partly because countries of our size tend to have approximately 200 parliamentary deputies, and partly because large parliamentary factions are impossible to handle. [passage omitted]

Furthermore, I do not think that a seventh party could join the ranks of the existing parliamentary parties, which all have an established membership, an infrastructure, and a program. [passage omitted]

3. Out of the current visible tendencies in Hungary, it is worrisome to see that extreme right-wing views are being aired even in the National Assembly; perhaps it is comforting to know that politicians with such extreme right-wing views are increasingly being forced to the periphery within their own parties. The extreme left is also to be heard sometimes, and it has an influence over our society. I see a far greater danger in the populist tendency that is manifest even within the National Assembly; populism has several highly intellectual representatives. Nevertheless, populist representatives can be handled on their own—the real challenge would be if populist representatives united. [passage omitted]

Justice Minister Balsai Queried on Legislation

AU1004102591 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Apr 91 p 8

[Interview with Justice Minister Istvan Balsai by Andras Sereg; place and date not given: "The National Assembly Should Not Take Over the Role of the Government"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Excerpts] According to the justice minister, the Antall cabinet recognized as early as the fall of 1990 that, under the current statute regulations, the National Assembly would not be able to pass the planned amount of new laws. A number of letters have been exchanged between the government and the National Assembly on the subject ever since.

[Balsai] It is unfortunate that the National Assembly is selecting from among our proposals, because it is the task of the government, rather than that of the National Assembly, to determine the order in which various proposals are discussed.

[Sereg] Why has the government acted only now? Why did it not act in September?

[Balsai] I do not think that the government was late in acting. If we look at the events as they occurred, one has to agree that, because of the reorganization of our government structure and the starting-up of parliamentary activity, there was no time at all to deal with legislation before mid-summer. [passage omitted]

[Sereg] Both the government and the National Assembly, however, are responsible for this state of affairs. While you saw that the National Assembly was unable to reduce its backlog, you continued to submit various bills.

[Balsai] We submit our proposals immediately because we think that the National Assembly would not take over the role of the government. The government is in a position to bring important issues to the legislature, issues important for the governing process. It is not the function of the National Assembly to establish other priorities.

[Sereg] Nevertheless, the government recently set up an order according to which certain issues should be discussed by the National Assembly.

[Balsai] We want to make it clear that we need orderly ownership relations and modern economic regulations to preserve Hungary's capacity to function. We gave preference to these bills in our note sent to the National Assembly chairman. At the same time, we also proposed that the National Assembly introduce an accelerated procedure regarding certain professional legislative matters, based on the activity of the parliamentary committees. At the same time, we are urging the creation of a new statute as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

[Sereg] There was not much time available to discuss the bill on administrative courts because the Constitutional Court clearly determined a deadline for settling this issue. Then, in the parliamentary debate, several deputies asked whether we have a concept for the administration of justice at all?

[Balsai] Yes, we do. We have already submitted several proposals to the National Assembly, and we are also working on the preparation of several other bills. We do not focus great attention on publishing our legislative

concepts connected with the administration of justice. This does not mean that we do not have such concepts. [passage omitted]

Assembly Committee Debates Foreign Broadcasts

LD1004174891 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] The National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee is debating the Zwack affair, along with other timely issues, including Hungarian Radio foreign broadcasts Peter Zentai reports:

The Hungarian radio foreign broadcast editorial department has a right to exist, and the idea that supervision over it should be taken out of the direct jurisdiction of the chairman of Hungarian radio must be supported. This is what the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee decided after heaaring the views of those affected and of the Cultural Committee, which also dealt with the issue. Who will supervise foreign broadcasts remains unclear, because at today's session the deputies did not and could not receive a guarantee as to whether the Hungarian and other language broadcasts beamed abroad would not become a means of propaganda should the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strengthen its participation in the supervisory process.

The committee is continuing its meeting.

KSH Presents Preliminary Census Results

AU1004131391 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Apr 91 pp 1, 4

[Denes Kovacs report: "What Does the Census Tell Us?"]

[Text] The Central Statistical Office [KSH] has already published the preliminary results of the census carried out at the beginning of this year. A quick computer analysis of a random 2 percent of the total data enabled the KSH to present a preliminary report on the following areas: demography, schooling, employment ratios, domestic and family relations, as well as housing. The KSH was able to present this report before the actual processing of all available information.

Arpad Meszaros, head of a department at the KSH, informed our newspaper about some of the significant changes that have taken place in the sphere of employment over the last decade.

In Hungary's population, the number of active wage-earners totalled 48.3 percent in 1970, but by 1990, this figure had fallen to 43.1 percent. The following reasons explain this drop: An increasingly small number of retirement-aged people are carrying on with their work; the number of disabled pensioners has grown; many people have opted for early retirement; furthermore, the generations reaching employment age are smaller nowadays, and more and more people from these generations are continuing with their studies. Open unemployment appeared during the second half of the eighties, and at the beginning of this year, a total of 100,000 people were registered as unemployed—a far greater number than the official statistics of the time [the second half of the eighties]. That is explained by the fact that this year's unemployment figures include first-time job seekers as well as all those who are currently without a job.

Meszaros stressed that with the structural adjustment of Hungary's economy, the number of people working in the manufacturing sector [anyagi agazatok] had dropped by six percentage points during the eighties. This tendency already appeared during the seventies in Hungary's industry, and the tendency grew during the eighties. Thus, the number of industrial workers dropped by 340,000 people over the last decade (an almost 20-percent drop); the main reductions took place in heavy industry and in the building industry. It is interesting to note that during the seventies, the number of people working in the tertiary sector grew considerably, but in the eighties, this tendency came to a standstill; in fact, a certain decrease appeared in transportation, the postal services, and telecommunications. As from 1982, and during the last years of the decade, new kinds of small organizations and private firms appeared in almost every sector of the economy, yet at the beginning of this year, the Hungarian economy was still characterized by the domination of traditional large-scale works.

Meszaros informed us that during the eighties, a significant change took place in the age pattern of both manual and white-collar workers. It was particularly the number of middle-aged employees that grew over this period of time. In 1970, the number of manual workers aged 30 to 54 represented 52 percent of the total number of blue-collar workers, but by 1990, this number had grown to 66 percent; similarly, the number of white-collar workers aged 30 to 54 grew from 58 percent in 1970, to 75 percent in 1990. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in 1990, half of the total number of Hungary's manual workers were skilled workers, whereas only a third were skilled workers in 1980. At the same time, there were not even half as many unskilled laborers in 1990 as there had been in 1970; the proportion had sunk from 29 percent to only 12 percent. It is also interesting to see that the proportion of young people in white-collar jobs has significantly decreased over the last two decades; this is mainly due to a smaller need for new recruitments.

Apart from a lot of other noteworthy details, it is interesting to observe that at the beginning of the year, there were still more than 1 million daily commuters—although compared to 1980, this represents a decrease of 116,000 people. This change has mainly affected the manufacturing sector. Presumably, the number of commuters has been limited by the proliferation of small and private firms.

Central Statistical Office Continues Impartiality

AU1004174391 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 6 Apr 91 p 4

[Interview with Gyorgy Vukovich, chairman of the Central Statistical Office, by Zsuzsa Varga; place and date not given: "The Statistics of the Power or the Power of Statistics"—first paragraph is NEPSZAVA introduction]

[Excerpts] Information is power. If you like, political power. This fact is also well known in the almost 125-year-old Central Statistical Office [KSH]; its recently appointed chairman, Gyorgy Vukovich maintains that statistics are part of the infrastructure of a country, just as the roads, the bridges and the network of telephone cables are.

[Varga] Because the chairman has been working for the KSH since 1956, we should get a firsthand answer to our question: How much truth is in the common belief that statistics have been manipulated for decades in our country?

[Vukovich] Bad information is not information. We always collected correct information. In knowledge of the house "secrets," I can confirm that we never collected false data to comply with predetermined aims—but, those conclusions, which did not justify the political expectations, were not made public. [passage omitted]

Most of the taboos were lifted in the last decade, but we still have some conflicts with the authorities, regarding poverty for example. We prepared a number of reports on this topic from the sixties onwards. The subject, as they say, was in the air, but the word poverty could not be written down. Instead, we applied such paraphrases as: people in a cumulatively disadvantageous situation.

[Varga] It would be hard to conceal poverty today. As a consequence, there are a number of new notions, at least for the statisticians.

[Vukovich] Yes, for example we have been calculating the minimum wage since 1982, but they have only been made public in the last two years. [passage omitted]

Our research drew attention to our self-destructing life-style. We work the most within Europe, because people are forced to supplement their income by working on the household farm, or in the second and third economy. I maintain that, even if indirectly, we influenced public opinion by our surveys, and drew attention to the greatest social problems. I can say the same about our housing statistics. We made a survey about the tenants of rented apartments, and found out, that there were very many impoverished large families and single old age pensioners in Budapest, whose means of living would be put at risk by a rent-increase. All these data were hardly ever taken into consideration by the previous governments.

[Varga] What about the present one?

[Vukovich] Unfortunately, they also have not taken much notice. This is shown in several measures that would have been different had they used our survey results. [passage omitted]

[Varga] How do you adjust to the challenges?

[Vukovich] We reorganized the office. The basic principle is that we created two main divisions, one for examining data about the population and the other about the economic units. This structure is more sensible than the previous ones were and more suited to dealing with the new phenomena. [passage omitted]

[Varga] We have already mentioned at the beginning of our conversation that information is: power. Let us return to this subject, and tell us what you mean by this?

[Vukovich] Statistics are a service in a democratic country. There are no special end-users for our data, everyone has access to them at the same time and can use them freely. In our case too, impartiality means that we cannot put anyone into a more advantageous or disadvantageous position. To ensure this, we will continue to send the results of our surveys to the government, the parties, interested groups, and the press at the same time.

Foreign Debt Decreases; Stands at $20.5 Billion

AU1004170191 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 9 Apr 91 p 9

[MTI report: "Hungary's Dollar Debts Have Decreased"]

[Text] The strong increase in the price of U.S. dollar against the German mark [DM] and the yen had a favorable effect on Hungary's overall debt. Expressed in U.S. dollars, the foreign debt has decreased by $600-700 million and currently stands at around $20.5 billion—said Akos Cseres, deputy head of a main department at the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] to the question of MTI.

One-third of the medium- and long-term debt of around $19 billion is listed in U.S. dollars, one-quarter in DM and also one-quarter in yen. The MNB took up loans and issued bonds to the value of more than $1.3 billion in the first quarter of 1991, while it repaid around $500 million. This way, in the mean time, the MNB's foreign currency reserves rose to a relatively safe $1.7 billion, from $1.2 billion in December 1990.

The current balance of payments in hard currencies has turned out better than expected, an estimated $150 million surplus is expected by the end of the first quarter of 1991. The government expected a $1.2 billion deficit for 1991 when it signed this year's agreement with the IMF. Akos Cseres emphasized, however, if a solvent Soviet market does not open for the Hungarian export in the second quarter of 1991, a large deficit could appear in our current balance of payments by June 1991.

The MNB is expecting to borrow at least $700 million in the second quarter of 1991. Out of this, the IMF will make a payment of $220 million in compliance with our medium-term agreement. Apart from this, more bonds will be issued, a loan from the World Bank is also expected, and we are having talks with the Group of 24 about borrowing a larger sum. Our bank is also expecting $100-150 million in foreign capital to enter Hungary in the next three months, depending on the speed of privatization.

Finance Minister's Visit To Germany Previewed

LD1004140791 Budapest MTI in English 1102 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 10, 1991 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Hungary's Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa leaves this afternoon for a one-and-a-half day visit to Germany during which he will meet Finance Minister Theodor Waigel, Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pohl, as well as senior representatives of a number of commercial banks. Talks will focus on closer financial cooperation between Hungary and Germany, a spokesman for the Hungarian Finance Ministry said.

Hungarian-German trade is expected to top 4 billion USD [U.S. dollars] this year. Last year Hungarian exports to the FRG were 1.61 billion USD, and imports 1.49 billion USD, while exports to the GDR were 598 million roubles, and imports 1.12 billion roubles. After monetary union, Hungary's exports to the former GDR dropped dramatically, resulting in a deficit of 500 million roubles at the end of 1990. Ways of settling the deficit are expected to feature in Mr Kupa's talks.

After Japan, Germany is Hungary,s largest creditor. The National Bank of Hungary (NBH) [MNB] issues bonds to the tune of 400-500 million USD annually on the German money market and German commercial banks are Hungary's main partners in consortium loans. This year there has been only one NBH bond issue in Germany and no loans at all have been taken out.

Soviet Debt Payment, Troop Pullout Link Examined

LD1004111491 Budapest MTI in English 1005 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 10, 1991 (MTI-ECONEWS)—The Hungarian position seems to be softening on the question of linking settlement of the USSR's debts to Hungary to the cost of Soviet troop withdrawals. Although Hungary insists that the two questions should be treated separately, it seems likely that after the financial implications of the troop withdrawal have been agreed, the two bills will be settled at the same time.

Hungary originally wanted the Soviet Union to pay the current account surplus of 2 billion roubles over 1-1.5 years, but it now seems that it is ready to accept a longer period of 3-3.5 years. At the same time the Hungarians were unwilling to shoulder any of the costs of the Soviet troop pullout, but recently Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa has hinted that Hungary would now be ready to pay something for vacated Soviet Army facilities in advance.

The Hungarian-Soviet current account featured an 800-million-rouble Hungarian surplus in both 1989 and 1990, while this year the figure had already reached 400 million roubles by March 31, the deadline for the ending of rouble accounting in bilateral trade.

The Soviet Union is demanding that 1.7 billion of the total 2 billion transferable roubles be written off as payment for facilities vacated by its troops. Both these figures, under an earlier agreement to convert the debts into US dollars at a rate of 0.92 roubles to the dollar, now work out to 1.56 billion and 1.8 billion USD [U.S. dollars] respectively. However while the 1.8 billion USD Hungarian claim is fixed and agreed, the Soviet claim is still subject to negotiations.

Under an agreement signed by Hungarian and Soviet authorities on Monday, a detailed list will be drawn up of all damage caused by Soviet troops both to buildings and the environment, which will be handed in by June 30, 1991, the deadline for the last troops to leave. A Finance Ministry official has confirmed that the final sum will most likely be set against the Soviet debt while the remaining Hungarian surplus will be used as credit to boost Hungarian exports to the Soviet Union.

Statement Issued on EC Association Agreement

LD1004103391 Budapest MTI in English 0848 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 10, 1991 (MTI-ECONEWS)—It was not Hungary's objective to wind up preparatory talks on the association agreement between Hungary and the EC before the end of the first half of the year, Endre Juhasz, head of department at the Ministry of International Economic Relations and head of the Hungarian delegation involved in the discussions, told ECONEWS yesterday.

The current EC president said on Monday that difficulties encountered during the negotiations have resulted in a situation which make it dubious whether the talks can, in fact, reach a successful conclusion in the first half of the year, and hinted that there was a chance that the discussions could drag on considerably longer.

Mr Juhasz stressed that the ideal thing would be to reach agreement on the most important issues by the end of July, i.e., the start of the summer recess.

The actual speed was not of the essence here, he said: What was important was whether the desired agreement could be concluded by the end of the year, so it could come into force as originally scheduled on January 1, 1992.

The current EC president, Jacques Santer, prime minister of Luxembourg, said that Hungary's ultimate goal—full EC membership—does not belong to the agenda of the current talks.

Commenting on this EC position, Endre Juhasz said Hungary would like to see the expression of this intention feature in the preamble to the association agreement to be concluded with the EC.

As the official EC response to this is not expected before the next round of talks at the end of April, it was irrelevant to argue about the issue, he went on.

Hungary's full EC membership does not depend on that round of talks, either, Mr Juhasz told ECONEWS.

At the latest round of talks, Hungary submitted to the EC a comprehensive draft agreement on economic and trade cooperation.

No official response has yet been received.

The Hungarian position is that the free-trade zone relating mainly to industrial products should be extended to steel and textile products, an issue the EC has contended.

As to farm produce, however, special allowances are expected to be granted, Mr Juhasz said.

Reportage on Jeszenszky's Visit to Norway

WA0904183191

For reportage on the visit by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky to Norway, including reports on his talks with Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, please see the Nordic Countries section of the 9 April West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Dubinin Promises Soviet Withdrawal From Swidnica

LD1004200591 Warsaw PAP in English 1704 GMT 10B Apr 91

[Text] Walbrzych, April 10—Commander of the Soviet troops in Poland General Victor Dubinin pledged to finally withdraw the Soviet garrison stationing in Swidnica, south-western Poland, by the end of August in a letter sent to the Walbrzych provincial governor.

Some of the objects used by the Soviet soldiers have already been taken over by the local authorities and assigned for housing purposes, cultural institutions and medical units.

Skubiszeweski Comments on German Treaty Talks

AU1004201691 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6-7 Apr 91 p 7

[Interview with Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski by Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk; place and date not given: "Poland-Germany: Our Ideas on the Minorities Question"]

[Text] [Kolodziejczyk] The Polish minority in the FRG and the German minority in Poland are the subject of the fifth round of negotiations on the treaty on good-neighborly relations and partner-like cooperation between Poland and Germany, which started in Warsaw on Thursday (4 April). It is well known that there are differences between the two sides on the issue, and in light of this, I would like to ask you to explain Poland's position.

[Skubiszewski] Our concept of a minority is based on two issues: on citizenship and the subjective recognition of foreign origin—a foreign language, culture, or tradition.

Thus, for example, Polish citizens are members of the German minority in Poland or, to put it another way, they are persons who possess Polish citizenship and consider themselves to be of German descent or identify with the German language, German culture, or German traditions.

[Kolodziejczyk] Is it true that Poland is avoiding the concept of "minority" in the talks?

[Skubiszewski] No, the Polish sides does, for example, agree to the use of the words "German minority."

[Kolodziejczyk] It was thought that negotiations on this question would be completed sooner and that the current round, which is going to be continued tomorrow, would last two days.

[Skubiszewski] The talks on the minorities question are not taking a long time. They started during the fourth round in Bonn (in March of this year) and are currently being continued. On the last occasion, the two sides only set out their positions and that meant that there was little time left for negotiating.

On the other hand, a general point that can be made is that the talks are dragging on as they were interrupted for two months—mainly at the request of the German side—on account of the elections and the creation of a new government in Germany, but also because the German side was wondering about how to approach the minorities question.

[Kolodziejczyk] Where do the problems lie, then?

[Skubiszewski] The individual articles of the draft treaty dealing with questions relating to national minorities are quite long, so we have something to talk about. It is obvious, of course, that on certain points our views differ. Negotiations are in progress, however, and at the moment it is difficult to predict their outcome.

[Kolodziejczyk] Do you think that this will be the final round of talks on the treaty?

[Skubiszewski] We have reached the final stages of the talks, but I do not think that the Warsaw round will be the last one. There are still all manner of articles that have to be discussed or are even still to be written. In some cases, our positions are so similar that things could be settled quickly. It is true that we find ourselves coming back to certain issues that we thought had already been cleared up. This applies, for example, to a number of problems concerning economic cooperation between our two states, but they are not of great importance. The content of a treaty is finally settled when the text has been initialed. Incidentally, in the case of the present treaty, I am not sure whether it will have to be initialed. We might sign it straightaway.

Country Seen as 'Great Bargain' for Europe

AU1004123991 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5 Apr 91 p 5

[Ewa Boniecka commentary: "No Breakthrough, But A Step Closer"]

[Text] The dignified and leisurely "capital of Europe"—as Eurocrats of various nationalities call Brussels—was not really prepared—it would seem—for the way that President Walesa unceremoniously unloaded the whole basket of issues that needed to be discussed. Walesa's temperament, personality, and his way of arguing the issue of Poland's entry into the EC often sharply contrasted with the smooth and urbane style of the replies coming from his interlocutors.

Nevertheless, it is possible that he succeeded in conveying the Poles' impatience and the extent of their gamble in their aspiration to return to Europe to EC Commission Chairman Jacques Delors, his colleagues, and the members of the European Parliament. By demonstrating that without the EC opening outward to

Poland—in the shape of a treaty of association containing concrete commitments that the next stage will be Poland's full membership—our country could be pushed into a blind alley of the so-called third way between "the unbending West" and a destabilized East. Lech Walesa projected a vision of a "silver curtain" that would divide Europe into the poor and the affluent; into one part that was stable and integrating within the group of the 12 member states and the economically devastated Eastern-Central part.

He did not ask for sympathy, but called for "equal treatment" in the negotiations on the treaty of association. He presented the argument that by admitting Poland into the EC, the EC would be making a "great bargain" and a political investment for the future through the creation of a system of mutual security. "We are giving you a historic opportunity, having toppled communism in Central Europe. What we want from you in return is help in our transition to democracy and a free market economy," he kept repeating.

These words are not new, but the president gave them a dramatic political, economic, and human emphasis.

Will he succeed in spurring Brussels to accelerate political decisions and to greater flexibility in the association negotiations? As the English say, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating," thus it will probably not be the upcoming round of talks in April, but the next one scheduled for June 1991 that will bring a more promising response.

What the visit did achieve can be summed up as greater mutual understanding and a rapprochement of positions in the matter of greater accessibility of Polish products to the EC market in the association treaty and a confirmation that, in one form or another, Poland is assured a secure place in an integrated Europe. Delors was not very precise on this point, but for the first time he expressed "openness" towards the Polish position.

Brussels is still learning to understand Polish problems on the stony path toward Europe. The combination of symbolism, subtle political blackmail, and economic arguments that the president used in his talks has produced—I feel—a favorable response for Poland. If his upcoming visits to France and Great Britain, as well as his talks with some other leaders of the 12 member EC states, succeed in giving impetus to the process of Poland's step by step integration into the EC, the implementation of reforms in Poland will become more effective. Poland can indeed be a "great bargain" for Europe.

Russian Supreme Soviet Delegation Begins Visit

LD1004204191 Warsaw PAP in English 1929 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Warsaw, April 10—A delegation of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Foreign Committee has arrived on a visit to Poland following an invitation from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Senate.

The delegation, which is led by chairman of the International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee of the Russian parliament, Vladimir Lukin, is to meet here with speakers of the Sejm and Senate as well as members of the foreign committees of both chambers of the Polish Parliament.

The Russian parliamentarians are to take part in a discussion on "Russia and Central Europe" organized by the Senate's Centre of International Studies.

Poland is also hosting at present a delegation of Soviet deputies from Belorussia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, who are led by deputy chairman of the Agricultural and Food Economy Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Erik Gukasov. The delegation visited a number of individual and cooperative farms in Poland and was received by Sejm Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz. It is also expected that the Soviet parliamentarians will meet with the Sejm Agricultural Committee, hold talks with Poland's agriculture minister and officials of the Agricultural Market Agency.

Deputy Interviewed on Aspects of New Constitution

PM1004153091 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 22 Mar 91 p 9

[Interview with Professor Janusz Trzcinski, parliamentary deputy and subcommission chairman of the Sejm Constitutional Commission for the State's Political System, by Malgorzata Sadowy-Piatek; place and date not given: "Who Will Pass the New Constitution?"]

[Text] [Sadowy-Piatek] You head the subcommission that has carried out the lion's share of the work on the preparation of the proposed new constitution. As we have heard, the draft constitution is virtually ready now. The debate on this document, however—which is, after all, the state's most important legislative act—has been taking place practically on the remote margins of our political life. Could the present Sejm still pass the new constitution?

[Trzcinski] Our Parliament announced its decision to dissolve itself in the fall of this year; however, I expect that both the Sejm and the Senate will take part in drafting the new constitution's definitive text and submitting it to public consultation. Could the present Parliament actually pass the constitution? I believe we would want to do so, considering the vast scope of the work we have done. Nevertheless, as far as I am concerned, it is not a matter of claiming credit and prestige for the effort. There are some who believe that this Parliament is not worthy of formulating and promulgating the new constitution. It was all right for it to introduce all the other fundamental state reforms, but it does not deserve to pass the constitution. I do not intend to enter into polemics with this viewpoint, though I myself am very much involved in the matter.

[Sadowy-Piatek] There was a time when people said that the present Sejm was intended to play the role of a constituent assembly and that the new constitution would be passed on 3 May. Would that be at all possible?

[Trzcinski] The Constitutional Commission has practically completed its task. The draft still lacks a chapter on the projected socioeconomic system.

[Sadowy-Piatek] It is surely not coincidental that this is the most controversial section of the new constitution, is it? Even though it is supposed to establish only the most general framework of this system.

[Trzcinski] The current advancement of the work is the result of the lack of a clear-cut vision of the future model of the system in question. On the one hand, the relevant subcommission contains such liberals as, for example, Prof. Zawislak, its previous chairman, and on the other hand, it also accommodates such figures as Deputy Bugaj, with ideas hailing straight out of his "Solidarity of Labor" group. The subcommission is currently chaired by Deputy Dynowska, and my information is that its work is nearing completion. Theoretically, then, it would be possible to meet the date of 3 May as the official passing of the new constitution. However, when we consider the prevailing public mood of the moment, no one is likely to bother with the new constitution now, and this is something to be regretted.

[Sadowy-Piatek] There are other serious controversies involved, too. For example, the one concerning the Senate. Not everyone favors the idea of retaining the parliamentary upper house in our power system. There are also several alternative concepts of placing the Senate among other bodies within the state apparatus.

[Trzcinski] According to the concept favored by the Constitutional Commission, the Senate is given a role as a parliamentary house representing local self-government structures. In the draft constitution currently formulated by the Senate—which has not yet been announced—that house is envisaged, in its present form, as a representation of individual voivodships: a parliamentary house of a political nature, designed to participate in the legislative process and to play a role in setting up certain state bodies.

[Sadowy-Piatek] In this case, we can expect that the Sejm's concept of a Senate as a parliamentary house designed to represent self-government structures will lead to a conflict with the present Senate, can we not? After all, not only was the latter granted very considerable powers to begin with, but it also extended these powers on quite a large scale during the present term of office.

[Trzcinski] Of course, we must take this into account, too.

[Sadowy-Piatek] Apart from the separate drafts of the constitution prepared by the Sejm and the Senate, there are also several other drafts of the proposed new constitution: two individual drafts presented by constitutional jurists, and two drafts put up by political parties— the Democratic Party [SD] and the Polish Peasants Party [PSL]. These drafts were prepared, as it were, independently from one another. Do we have some official body that in some way coordinates this very considerable work?

[Trzcinski] No, there is no formal body to coordinate the work on the formulation of the drafts of the proposed new constitution.

[Sadowy-Piatek] So what are these projects prepared for? Is it just for the authors' satisfaction alone?

[Trzcinski] The Constitutional Commission is working to discharge the task entrusted to it by the Sejm. The other drafts are submitted to the Sejm independently. The commission can consult them, but it is not obliged to make use of them; nevertheless, we do, of course, use the expert knowledge and advice of a number of specialists.

[Sadowy-Piatek] In this case, we can expect that the anticipated controversies, differences of opinion, and various alternative versions will not really manifest themselves in their full force until the official debate on the new constitution, can we not?

[Trzcinski] It is to be expected that all parliamentary caucuses will present their opinions and propose amendments, but the fundamental text under discussion will be the draft submitted by the Constitutional Commission. Having said that, I must admit that I do not do not really know what the Senate will do with its own draft. It is conceivable that a special procedure will have to be developed for the formulation and promulgation of the new constitution so both the Senate and the Sejm drafts can be accommodated.

[Sadowy-Piatek] Could you explain this further?

[Trzcinski] There are three possible variants of the procedure for the formulation and promulgation of a new constitution: the procedure currently in force, based on article 106; a modified procedure, requiring the addition of a new article 107, according to which the new constitution would be passed by the National Assembly; and finally, a new constitutional law on the procedure of the formulation and promulgation of a new constitution (not excluding the possibility of a national referendum.)

[Sadowy-Piatek] What were the fundamental tenets according to which the Constitutional Commission formulated the text of the draft of the proposed new constitution?

[Trzcinski] At the start of our work on the new fundamental law, we agreed on three basic premises: first, that our point of reference would be provided by the 1989 amendments (of April and December) to the Constitution currently in force; second, that we would assume a parliamentary state system; third, that we would accept certain elements taken from the system based on a division of power. Consequently, we formulated the text of the proposed new constitution according to these premises; at the same time, we fashioned certain formulations on solutions enshrined in the March 1921 constitution.

[Sadowy-Piatek] Did you use any foreign models?

[Trzcinski] We adapted certain solutions applied in the German (FRG) Constitution, especially those establishing a strong position for the prime minister and the government. We wanted to guard against the possibility of governmental destabilization in a situation where a large number of political groups within Parliament are unable to reach a common agreement.

[Sadowy-Piatek] In your discussion of the emergence of a regular party system in Poland, you presented an unequivocal thesis according to which there is no limit to the price that is worth paying to establish a sound system of parliamentary democracy.

[Trzcinski] This ties in with my firm belief that the electoral law should be based on the principle of proportional representation rather than majority vote. This means that all truly significant political groups should be admitted and represented in Parliament—without going to extremes of absurdity, of course. You cannot decide a priori that only two, three, or four currently dominant political groups will be admitted. The eventual party system in Poland must develop by way of evolution.

[Sadowy-Piatek] These things cannot be ordained by decree.

[Trzcinski] I think that our past political experience can also play a significant role here, as can our parliamentary tradition.

[Sadowy-Piatek] According to the new constitution, what type of state system will we have, then?

[Trzcinski] Poland will be a parliamentary democracy.

[Sadowy-Piatek] This is a very general definition.

[Trzcinski] On the whole, the particulars of the system described by this definition are fairly well-known. Briefly, it denotes an arrangement whereby Parliament commands the dominant power in the state, while at the same time the system of division of power is retained.

[Sadowy-Piatek] We also have proponents of the presidential system.

[Trzcinski] Indeed, in the beginning certain deputies suggested that the presidential system should be adopted, but in the long run this did not find favor with the Constitutional Commission. However, I recently read that the Center Accord will opt for the presidential-parliamentary system.

[Sadowy-Piatek] To conclude, I would like to ask you whether the authors of the draft of the proposed constitution are considering any action to enhance the prestige and standing of our jurisprudence in the eyes of the public—after all, this prestige has recently suffered some considerable damage.

[Trzcinski] Without a doubt, the model of the future state system that we adopted in the draft of the proposed new constitution is close to the wishes of the majority of our public. I trust that this attitude of approval will help us in our efforts to enhance respect for the law in our society, however imperfect our law may be. If the authority of the law is undermined for any reason, even if we believe the reason is valid, we must be aware that someone else could make a similar attempt against it in other circumstances. We should also remember that other nations, whose legal tradition and culture we so eagerly invoke, and whom we want to join within Europe, have worked on the shape of their legal tradition for whole long centuries.

[Sadowy-Piatek] Yet here in Poland we often treat even such weighty legal acts as the state constitution as a not particularly important piece of official paper that can be altered, conveniently interpreted, or even "superseded" by legislative acts of a lower legal standing.

[Trzcinski] This question touches on the issue of whether the original legislation system should be open or closed. We worked on this question, too. What, in effect, constitutes the law? Is it only the clearly set-out constitutional precepts that can claim this distinction, or should we also regard other acts, not specifically mentioned in the fundamental law, as the law in force? The latter practice, which we are following now, is an open legislation system. Well, we decided in favor of a closed original legislation system.

[Sadowy-Piatek] Will this principle result in a limited number of new parliamentary acts being issued? In other words, will it result in lifting some of the burden from the shoulders of our recently heavily overworked parliament? Does everything have to be regulated by parliamentary acts here?

[Trzcinski] The adoption of such a solution will undoubtedly result in a reduction of the issue of enacting clauses appendant to relevant laws. However, first and foremost it will mean that the legislation in force, to which all citizens will be obliged to adhere, will be defined exclusively by the legal acts contained in the new constitution. This will mark a very considerable progress for us.

[Sadowy-Piatek] Thank you for the interview.

Golaczynski Interviewed on Former Special Service

AU1004122991 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Sejm Deputy Jerzy Golaczynski, chairman of the Sejm National Defense Commission, by Jan Ordynski; place and date not given: "A Secret Discussion on Special Services"—first paragraph is RZECZPOSPOLITA introduction]

[Text] The Sejm National Defense Commission and Internal Affairs Commission met on 3 April to hear a report by the Sejm subcommission that is investigating

the work of the former Internal Military Service. Unfortunately, journalists were barred from this meeting, for it had been decided that the contents be kept secret. I asked Internal Affairs COmmission Chairman Jerzy Golaczynski for a few details.

[Golaczynski] Last year we wanted to examine reports on changes inside the military counterintelligence service, but the Ministry of National Defense failed to supply them. Therefore, at the initiative of Deputy J. Rokita, the two Sejm commissions at today's meeting appointed a subcommission to investigate the work of the former Internal Military Service, with particular attention to its work.

[Ordynski] How has this work been assessed?

[Golaczynski] The basic conclusion is that the work of this counterintelligence service was considerably at variance with the kind of work an institution like this normally performs, i.e. protecting the Army against infiltration by foreign intelligence services. The main accusation is that it exceeded its Army framework and infiltrated the political opposition. In the future, the activity of this service will be restricted to counterintelligence work in the Army.

[Ordynski] Did the subcommission recommend organizational and personnel changes, and has it been briefed on the Defense Ministry's activity as a result of the report?

[Golaczynski] These changes are already being implemented. A new structure of military counterintelligence has been introduced, in accordance with the subcommission's recommendations. There are still many matters to take care of, such as the problem of organization. It has been suggested that the regional structure of the counterintelligence should be abandoned in favor of a close link to military units. The second problem is supervision over the counterintelligence services.

[Ordynski] There has been practically no parliamentary supervision over these services.

[Golaczynski] Correct, that is why most deputies voted for the Sejm to exercise institutional supervision over them. Our investigations of the military counterintelligence have led us to conclude that it is essential to have a permanent parliamentary body to supervise the political work of these services. There is no rational reason why they should not be supervised this way, even if their work is of a special nature. The next Sejm can appoint such a permanent commission. In the meantime, we will authorize the present subcommission to supervise and control the work of all special services. We also indicated the need to pursue a proper personnel policy inside counterintelligence. This mainly involves applying the criterion of professionalism, loyalty, and expertise to the total exclusion of ideology. Finally, we will make decisions about penalties for anyone indulging in the destruction of former Internal Military Service files.

Seventy-One Political Parties Registered

LD1004213691 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 2020 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] We have 71 registered political parties. Twenty-five have appeared since February. The latest on records of the Voivodship Court in Warsaw is the Democratic-National Party [Stronnictwo Demokratyczno-Narodowe].

Iliescu Urged To Dissolve Constituent Assembly

AU1104122091 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1053 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 11/4/1991—Mentioning that, according to the Electoral Law, starting today, 11 April, nine months after the opening of the Constituent Assembly, Romania's president has the right to dissolve it, two journalists from "ROMANIA LIBERA" suggest President Iliescu to make use of this prerogative.

In the 11 April issue of the most influential opposition newspaper Petru Clej and Florin Gabriel Marculescu claim this solution has the following advantages:

The state of mind of the electorate is altogether different from that which propelled an overwhelming FSN [National Salvation Front] majority to parliament in the 20 May 1990 elections.

Several political personalities are in favour of a government of national union, difficult to achieve under the present circumstances, when the power is keen on maintaining its "lion's share," which is tantamount to a status quo while the opposition want a neutral personality at the top of a coalition cabinet, something the Front does not accept, considering its weight in parliament.

That would be an occasion for the parliament to get rid of some of its members with a troubled past.

The disadvantage of this solution would be to discontinue the legislative process. But the two journalists argue that by now we have a draft constitution that could, in a revised variant, be adopted before the end of the year. As for the current government, interrupting its activities would be no cause for alarm as the social tensions caused by its policy breed inefficiency anyway.

It should be mentioned that the electoral law does not compel the president of the republic to step down if anticipated legislative elections are held.

"ROMANIA LIBERA" made the proposal after an opinion poll published by "IRSOP" [Romanian Institute for Public Opinion Studies] polling institute which, in cooperation with a German firm, had accurately forecasted the last year elections results. The recent poll shows that the ruling National Salvation Front, whose national leader is Prime Minister Petre Roman, would now get less than half of the 20 May votes, but that both President Iliescu and Premier Roman are popular among more than 55 percent of the electorate.

Barladeanu Condemns Government in TV Interview

AU1004102691 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2213 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 9/4/1991—The president of the Senate considers that Premier Roman's government will not resist till the end of its mandate unless it mends its mistakes in the field of economic strategy.

In an interview broadcast Tuesday [9 April] evening by the Romanian Television, Mr. Barladeanu appreciated that the government should be deeply reshuffled and referred again to his proposal made in the Senate two weeks ago concerning the setting up of a coalition government with the participation of the parliamentary opposition's representatives.

He underscored that he backed that idea even if it was not too well thought about because a coalition would bring "more wisdom and equilibrium" in the government and would render it more credible internationally.

In his opinion, such a government was possible because the main parties had similar general political outlook and all of them declared for multipartism and market economy.

In that context, Mr. Barladeanu rejected Mr. Brucan's proposal made at the television several days ago to set up a coalition government with extra-parliamentary forces because he considered it as in contradiction with the fundamental form of democracy, the parliamentary form.

The president of the Senate blamed again the government for what he called "a big strategic mistake", namely the fact that it had taken care only to implement the market economy and had not cared about the productive apparatus on the account that it had been formed in the distorting conditions of the centralized economy and that it had forgotten we had not another one.

Asked whether he was on the left or on the right of the National Salvation Front, Mr. Barladeanu considered that as far as social protection was concerned he was on the left side and reproached the government with not having prepared well the second price liberalization stage either as well as with ignoring the Romanian economists' opinions.

On the occasion Mr. Barladeanu resumed and developed his critical remarks made about a week ago in the Senate upon the National Salvation Front's statute and he kept on considering that he had made no mistake as President Iliescu had said in bringing that issue in the Parliament's debate.

Mr. Barladeanu gave the following explanation: it is quite normal for the parliamentarians of the government party to back its programme but not to have the statutory obligation to back the government's programme because it is not a party body. The relations between the government and the Parliament are established by the Constitution. It is not a party institution, but a state one. As president of the Senate, my fundamental duty is to protect the Parliament's prerogatives. This is why I draw the attention upon the fact that party problems interfere with state problems, that the government tries to keep the Parliament in check, to transform it into its toy. This would mean a return to the communist regime when the party and the government were the same.

In Mr. Barladeanu's opinion the government which should have been center-left oriented has now rightist

attitudes, even tendencies towards authoritarianism especially after the resolutions adopted during the recent FSN national convention which created the conditions for a possible dictatorship.

On the other hand, Mr. Barladeanu appreciated the "ROMANIA LIBERA" daily's intervention (the printing of a long list of intellectuals contesting his capacity as academician) as a political diversion.

Barladeanu's Quarrel With Parliament Reported

AU1004095391 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 4 Apr 91 pp 1, 2

[Dora Mezdrea article: "Letting Loose a Pin"]

[Text] The crumbling of the political grouping FSN [National Salvation Front]—a most heterogeneous, or better said, motley grouping—that is, the crumbling of a political groupings whose inner binding column is missing, was foreseeable and unavoidable. The reason is that, out of electoral and populist reasons, the FSN movement encompassed the most diverse categories of people with most divergent interests, whose goal was to win power, maintain their positions and privileges, or escape the rigor of the law (many people, much too many, remained unpunished in this country; their only choice was to bet on the powers that be; the latter, being themselves corrupted and installed by fraud, extended their protection to these people). As a result, the cheap show of the dismemberment does not come as a surprise to anyone.

The homogeneity of a political grouping is given by united action for a common goal; however, neither in politics, nor in any other sphere of human activity, can union based on lies, falsehood, abuse, and crime last for too long. There comes a time of parting, and not that alone, but also of letting loose a pin. To stick to this metaphor, there came the time for letting loose a pin in the FSN. As a matter of fact, several component pins got loose there, pins that affect and support each other, as the existence of the individual one depends on that of all other pins, while the breaking loose of one of them brings about the disintegration of all the others.

1. The Search for Scapegoats

Of course, in a democratic society, the government is subordinated to the Parliament; the latter can dissolve the government by a vote of no-confidence. The recent stance taken by Mr. Alexandru Barladeanu in full Parliament session could be considered as a profoundly democratic act. Mr. Barladeanu seems to take his duty of calling the government to account for its actions quite seriously: "Here is another example of illicit interference by the executive branch in the activity of the legislative, in a democratic state. How dare the government decide who should be the presidents of the two chambers, or suggest that they be dismissed (sic!)? This can only be decided by the respective chambers. This is not all. I can only guess the kind of material that lay at the basis of the government's discussion—because we were not invited nor informed about it; it must have been the material that some of you may know, after all it was published in the papers. What is this material? It was drafted by the office of Mr. Severin [Adrian Severin, minister, assistance to the prime minister for reform and relations with Parliament]..." The Senate president then examines the government's activity [which is actually one of his duties] as follows: "Were we to criticize now the first stage of the price liberalization, we would ask to be shown what we have gained so far from the reform. When I said, before the first stage of the liberalization, that we were not dealing with a liberalization, but rather a price increase, I was censored. This, however, is the reality. In actual fact, the second stage amounts to the same thing—namely, a price hike. Liberalization can exist (sic!) only if there is competition; since there is no competition, there can be no liberalization, particularly since price ceilings were also introduced. What kind of liberalization is it which does not permit one to jump over a ceiling?" Then, he suggested the formation of a coalition government: "In my opinion the country now needs a coalition government"; however, the reasons for Mr. Barladeanu's proposal about a coalition government are not his concern for the destiny of the country that is on the verge of chaos. Is Mr. Barladeanu afraid that the opposition—scoffed at and abused by the neocommunist power—will reap the benefits of the FSN charity? No way! The strategic truth is that he is trying to draw the opposition—for whom Mr. Barladeanu, like all FSN members, has no regard whatsoever: "I do not ask for a coalition government out of particular admiration for the opposition"—to share in the consequences of the disaster. Mr. Barladeanu's opinion is that "we are going not only through a difficult time, but a dangerous one, too." We agree that "if this country cannot support itself, it is not its fault, but rather the fault of its rulers." Today's rulers, however, are looking for a last solution of salvation, through a possible coalition government, to help "redress the situation at home. This would also bring us the much sought for trust from abroad." So, they are looking for scapegoats to blame for the country's disaster. There is a lot at stake: Drawing in the opposition into the government would lay responsibility for a part of the current leadership's errors on its shoulders. But the opposition cannot enter into such pacts. The FSN's desire to rule alone had been so strong that it spared no effort whatsoever to reach that goal.

The strange thing in this leaked out show of FSN dismemberment is that the FSN people are slowly coming around to admitting the truths often repeated, up to saturation point, by the opposition, such as: a) that the former bolsheviks have turned overnight into great democrats— "It is surprising that the people who are today making a lot of noise about democracy are those who in the past were cogs—basic cogs—in a system that could not be described as democratic" (Adrian Severin); b) that there is no true separation of powers in the state— "We thus witnessed the first violation of a Supreme Court of Justice decision by a prime minister. I do not

think that such a thing can happen in a democratic country that respects the state of law" (Barladeanu); c) that the government decides what the Parliament should do, and not the other way around.

Under these circumstances, with a minimum political clear-sightedness one can see the benefits that the FSN stands to reap from bringing the opposition into the government: a credibility plus abroad; the procurement of new credits for the prolongation of the agony; and, in the worst case, the casting of part of the blame on the opposition's shoulders. To govern alongside of the FSN would mean to accept all the illegal acts committed by it. If it is true that the technocrats who want economic reform were not involved in the events that compromised Romania, then they can distance themselves from the guilty parties and can start everything fresh by telling the truth about the unclarified issues of December 1989, continuing with the Tirgu Mures events, and culminating with the miners' incursion and other abuses.

If there is indeed a FSN faction with such intentions, if it is ready to implement these intentions, and if the justice bodies are allowed to do their duty, then the opposition will side with this FSN.

2. A Question of Psychoanalysis

The deplorable show put up by the government party in full parliamentary session also revealed a morbid predisposition of all speakers toward a constant obsession with plots, scenarios, and diversion. These predispositions can be easily psychoanalyzed—they are typical of people in power, who are afraid of losing it. This psychoanalytical approach reveals the existence of a complex that I have already called—a few months ago, in a press article bearing its very name—the "Usurper Complex." In that article, the complex is examined at the level of the behavioral algorithm of the country's president. Here, however, we come across the same complex at the level of the Senate and the government. At the highest level of the Senate, its president is obsessed by plots. A plot "worked out by Mr. Severin's office," with the purpose of removing Mr. Barladeanu. (All usurpers have this obsession) The plot, in Mr. Barladeanu's opinion, "aims at organizing a group within the Senate (sic!), which would be called pro-reform, would acquire an elitist spirit, and would take over the leadership of the Senate..."

Mr. Senator Fercala is also obsessed with treason: "...to avoid raising the issue with the representatives of the government—namely, how is it that such government documents are leaked out; tomorrow, or the day after, documents of particular importance for the security of the Romanian state might get out (...), what guarantees do I have now that such documents of national security importance pertaining the state's interests will not be leaked out?"

Concerning Mr. Adrian Severin, he, in his algorithm, presents another element of the usurper's complex: the obsession with diversion: "Diversion is another known and regrettable procedure; because, esteemed gentlemen, it is a diversion to transfer a problem that is of the exclusive realm of a party onto the realm of the relations between powers in the state." If the misplaced discussion of a party's internal problems in the country's legislative forum can be termed a diversion, how can one call Minister Adrian Severin's attitude of reducing all problems raised by the Senate President—most serious problems that fall within the government's jurisdiction—to a simple diversion?

Messrs. FSN people, you should really psychoanalyze your complexes!

Blandiana Airs Views on Current Trends in Country

AU1004174791 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 5 Apr 91 pp 1, 4

["Part one" of interview with Ana Blandiana, poet and prominent figure of the Civic Alliance, by Dora Mezdrea; place and date not given: "We Are With the Current of History"]

[Mezdrea] Esteemed Mrs. Blandiana, a short while ago, while attending the national convention of the National Salvation Front [FSN], I happened to come across somebody—actually a very intelligent person—who tried to prove to me that the government party currently leading Romania has used natural [from a political viewpoint] methods and did not commit errors; its goal was to lay hold of power by any means and that this road has nothing to do with morality. I ask you, who are not only a great poet, but also a conscience, is there any relationship between power and morality? Is there power without morality?

[Blandiana] In my opinion, or better said, from my angle of involvement, politics is totally identical with morality, since I am not interested in the struggle for power (I would even go so far as to claim the contrary). All I want—actually I should use the plural, because this is also the position of the Civic Alliance—is that we do our best to bring forth the time when politics develops within the framework of moral laws, so that nobody in Romania can say what the person you referred to said. In my opinion, we cannot reach a normal political life—I am not talking about an ideal situation, but rather about observing certain minimal requirements of normality in general—until we have a moral cleansing of our public life. First, we should clear these Augean stables, in which opportunism, corruption, and terror have unleashed the current ugliness; only then, will we have some hope. This is what we keep talking about in the Alliance, namely how to change mentalities, because unless we manage to do that (from the simplest man until the one aspiring to supreme power) we will not succeed. I am convinced of that, and I am desperate because I realize that things are moving ahead at an extremely slow pace, particularly since all those coming closer to power become infested by it. This is something that I cannot stand at all. Having adopted this position, we came to the conclusion that only by entering politics with the idea of refusing to take over the power, will we be able to change something in

the mentality of those coming in touch with politics. Of course, we are no absolute novices, although we have a good portion of naivete. I realize that only by taking over power can one extract any kind of change; until that time and before anything else, those who desire power should become educated. Mentalities should change in such as way as to ensure that those who take over power are also capable of relinquishing it. When a politician hands in his resignation because scores and hundreds of thousands of people are demanding it in the streets (as happens in any civilized country), only then will we have truly entered Europe; until that happens, we will not have gotten there yet, regardless of what happens and of the various degrees of trust put in our half truths by Europe's more or less prominent representatives.

[Mezdrea] In this respect, there are two ways of receiving support from Europe: political and economic. If the economic support is very necessary—and easy to explain—our leaders make a big hullabaloo about the so-called political support; on prime- time TV, they ostentatiously parade the medals they got... for political merits.

[Blandiana] I do not know more than you do about this subject. I can only draw some logical conclusions; I believe one should not pay too much importance to these medals, which are only some toys of an absolutely temporary value. Maybe all officials entering into contact with the representatives of the Strasbourg Parliament receive such medals....

[Mezdrea] There are, of course, certain diplomatic formalities....

[Blandiana] ...but the serious thing is that the much needed economic help has not yet arrived. I am not aware of the extent of the political aid. Maybe it is only a rumor spread around to give the impression that there is indeed such a political support; it could be just that. Regarding the economic aid, I believe that if it were to come, it would be extremely useful, not only to those in power, but also to the future of our democracy, because, it is my belief that the market economy breeds democracy: It is a live organism objectively breeding freedom. A man involved in the objective mechanisms of such an economy becomes a free man, because he is no longer bound to the state by a salary about which he himself knows that it is more a payment for his submission, rather than for his work. This applied to a very large majority of the Romanian people. This economic dependence of the citizen on the state—a dependence mixed with a vague feeling of uselessness, which gave one an acute feeling of guilt—is at the basis of the moral mud through which we are trying to make headway, but keep slipping instead.

[Mezdrea] The government's program foresees economic reform. Although we doubt its changes of success, all of us obviously wish it success because it affects the well-being of us all, but can economic reforms solve everything?

[Blandiana] I am not an expert in economy, but I know that our reforming depends of its reform and that our saving depends on its saving; however, I want to emphasize that I do not believe that these reforms can really be carried out by the people who trying to do it now. To me, this is the big problem. You see, in the past we used to say: "You pretend to pay us, we pretend to work." Now, my feeling is that one could paraphrase this black humor as follows: "You pretend to make economic reforms, we pretend to believe that these are economic reforms." A former secretary in charge of economic problems, for example, will never be able to implement a true reform toward the market economy, because, even if he wanted to, he has a certain mental structure and a certain way of seeing things and, if he is intelligent enough, he knows that if the reform is implemented, then he will be eventually eliminated by its objective dynamics; hence, it is not in his interest to promote reform. Consequently, he will invent all sorts of obstacles to hamper reform. The paradoxical and, in my opinion, extremely dramatic position of Romania's government is that it appears to be a resolute promoter of a reform that it cannot or even does not want to apply. Anyhow, it cannot apply it with the people that are currently trying to do it.

[Mezdrea] It seems to me that this reform is more plausible at the level of rhetoric....

[Blandiana] No, there are also profound and irreversible things happening. I say this because I have just returned from the countryside, and I was very impressed with the forces unleashed there, among the peasantry. I was afraid—particularly regarding this region around Bucharest—that the peasants' structure had been so much dissolved, that they would not even want to be given land, for example. On the contrary, things are happening just like at the end of the fairy tale Sleeping Beauty. We are faced with a spectacular awakening; everybody behaves as if the last 50 years had not existed. Regardless of how many defects this land law has and how many dramas or tragedies it will cause, it has unleashed this awakening, which, I believe, can no longer be turned back. There are primarily certain intellectual factors that are making quite an impact, in a state of full awareness, not of sleep, that used to be the sole guarantee of "our quietude."

[Mezdrea] Among the methods used by the ruling party to lay hold on power, the most preferred ones were, aside from populism, the slandering and hampering of the opposition in all possible ways. Moreover, when the earth is shaking under us, the FSN government claims that the opposition has no alternative programs, no better leaders, and so forth. In your opinion, what were the opposition's mistakes?

[Blandiana] It is very hard to give an answer....

[Mezdrea] What could have been done to counteract that ruthless strategy of slander? What kind of stand should have been made by people who spent years on end in Stalinist jails?

[Blandiana] It was very difficult... Imagine doing this just a few days after reorganization, because the slander campaign practically started in January [1990]. You see,

I believe that the greatest mistake one can make is to minimize the intelligence of the forces fighting against the opposition. The intelligence of these forces—in the last instance, it is nothing else but the intelligence of the repressive apparatus, which functioned very well in the past and is functioning with other methods now—realized that the main force they must fear now is that of the National Peasant Party, because it had been the strongest party in the past. Maybe they were scared that all of Transylvania, which had been solidly pro-Peasant Party in the past, will become so again. Consequently, they started the slandering campaign from the very first moments. In my opinion, what happened to Mr. Coposu [leader of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party] is only equalled by what happened to Mrs. Doina Cornea, two people who cannot be reproached for anything, and who, after the revolution, should have normally become the moral ideal and the target of the gratitude of the rest of us.

[Mezdrea] Moreover, we should have thanked God that these people (I am referring to those from the pre-war generation) are still alive, as they represent a direct link with what Romania used to be before the communist nightmare. We should have been grateful for the fact that they can still testify about how it used to be, that not all of them had been swallowed by the Stalinist jails, that they are still a live memory of past events, and that we do not need to learn about them just from books.

[Blandiana] Of course! To come back to your previous question, I find it hard to point out what mistakes were made by the political parties, because their situation was hellish, absolutely hellish! The December miracle would have had to last for another five months for the political parties to obtain a different result from the one they got. I sincerely believe, however, that their situation is substantially different now because—I hope I am not exaggeratedly optimistic—I think that people are beginning to wake up, and I am including here even those who, in the first moments, voted en masse for the majority party; these people are waking up and are looking for alternatives. The political parties should do everything possible to prove that they are the respective alternatives. I would even go so far as to say the following: I believe that the opposition political parties should prove that, together, they represent the alternative; at this time, I think that their different nuances are of no importance whatsoever.

'Part Two' of Interview

AU1004180191 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 6 Apr 91 pp 1, 4

["Part two" of interview with Ana Blandiana, poet and prominent figure of the Civic Alliance, by Dora Mezdrea; place and date not given: "We Are With the Current of History"]

[Text] [Mezdrea] The subject of the intellectual's refusal to engage in politics—I am referring mainly to the prominent intellectuals of this country—has been thoroughly discussed. For example, a writer told me: "I am a writer, I have my profession, and it does not concern me," while now, he is criticizing political parties. Here I notice a vicious circle; in a democratic system, the intellectual can stay aside telling himself "it does not concern me. Politicians should make politics." In our case, however, this cannot be done and to make the democratic system start functioning we need all the people, primarily intellectuals. There should certainly be a clear partition between political and non political activities, but only after the democratic system has started functioning.

[Blandiana] Yes, but first we have to reach that stage. I believe that in a way the Civic Alliance will represent an element of unity on the road toward this period. The Civic Alliance appeared as a sort of reaction to the desperation that there are no connecting elements whatsoever and accepted this truth in a realistic manner. Indeed, there is a reluctance to approach parties, a reluctance that is not specific solely of intellectuals. Certainly, we speak about intellectuals because they should have understood things better, but it can be noticed also in case of ordinary people. The Civic Alliance appeared exactly as a possible element of unity between the great mass of people who trust it, on one hand because it includes certain names who are trusted outside the political sphere and on the other hand—I am obstinately believing it—exactly because it is not a party and it said from the very beginning that it does not want power. What I am hoping for is that the Alliance will succeed, on one hand to achieve a solidarity among parties and on the other hand to endorse them, that is, to offer assistance and become their binding element. I often said that the goal of the Civic Alliance is to be more concerned with the electors that the elected ones. This is the great difference between the Civic Alliance and parties. Thus, if parties understand that for Romania at the moment not the political struggle of various groups (that is a struggle among them) is important but the unity to create an alternative to the current leadership, then the Civic Alliance will side with them and give them public endorsement. I hope that this beautiful utopia will be achieved, and not only because I am a naive and an optimistic person but because I believe that there is no other solution.

[Mezdrea] As far as we know, Mrs. Doina Cornea was in Brussels where she received the title of Doctor Honoris Causa. Starting from this fact—but without referring exclusively to Mrs. Doina Cornea—how could we explain the fact that the Romanians do not know how to respect their values?

[Blandiana] I think that I have an explanation for the reaction against all the old opposing elements and which in Mrs. Cornea's case reached the highest peaks of the absurd. I think that everything can be explained through the feeling of humiliation that the others felt seeing her courage. I have reached this conclusion hearing the Cluj residents talking about her in terms of real hatred and I

was asking myself how can this be possible? It would have been normal—normal! We live in such an abnormal world that normal becomes an unreachable ideal—so as I said, it would have been normal that the most people who love and admire her should be Cluj residents. Things are different, however. My only explanation—of an abyssal nature I realize that—is that in that period when she had courage, very many people felt humiliated by the fact that they were unable to show courage. Furthermore, this absurd and hateful feeling has turned into the monstrosity and filth of today. Unfortunately, the magazine ROMANIA MARE for example relies on this feeling of unconscious self-dissatisfaction of a category of people, which, unfortunately, is a pretty large category.

[Mezdrea] To expand the significance of my previous question, I would like to ask you how can you explain the fact that the Romanians are not interested in knowing their own history? I am talking about history as such: dates, figures, and facts—and not wise or pernicious interpretations—and about the presentation of history in an objective manner, which should enable a simple person to reason for himself about what is good or bad.

[Blandiana] When you say "Romanians" you are obviously referring to the majority of people in today's Romania, who are the people educated in the schools of the past 50 years. Well, it is not a secret to anybody that, to dominate a person, first you take away his memory, the memory of his previous freedom, this is the first thing, and then you can dominate him very easily. This memory has been almost destroyed and these people cannot be blamed for it.

I saw a television program recently and the reporter was asking several people at random in the street who was General Averescu and who was King Ferdinand. The great majority of the answers sounded like: "I do not know," or there were such incredible answers as: "I think [he was] a Romanian king" or "Oh, yes, it seems to me that it was [former King] Mihai's son," and so on and so forth. This is something inconceivable not only for the intellectuals but also inconceivable for a person who studied history at the lowest level of schooling. The most impressive answer was that of a worker who said (I am quoting approximately): "I do not know, the schools in which I studied did their duty, they did all they could to make me not know." This is the truth. What all the post war generations know, they know from their families, provided their parents were not scared to tell their children what they knew. In any event, obviously, in this struggle for the intellectual reconstruction of the Romanian people, the rewriting of history —as soon as possible, and in as simple form as possible, so everybody can understand it—is an absolute priority. As long as we do not know what is happening to us and as long as we do not know where we come from, we cannot know where we are heading. As a matter of fact, at another level—this time I am referring to the intellectuals—during the past years a kind of self-disdain could be noticed, and this feeling eliminated even what the others did not succeed in eliminating. A psychological stage was reached in which we ourselves were saying that the Romanians are the greatest cowards and the worst people, and look what the Hungarians are doing or look how the Polish people are acting and so on. I can remember hundreds of controversial discussions on this subject, hundreds of discussions during which I always recalled a very beautiful line from Blaga's [famous Romanian poet] literary work which says that there is no nation that can be so bad that it is not worth dying for, if you belong to that respective nation. Nobody has the right to condemn his own people. We do have the right—and even duty—to possess a very sharp critical spirit and we are duty-bound to judge ourselves very seriously, but the intellectuals have never had the right to condemn others, because they are responsible for others and it depends on them to make the others become different. Returning to the starting point, I also believe that the intellectuals are obligted to get involved in this moment of our history and pull out this the cart in which we all find ourselves now from the current swamp. Later, when there a political class emerges, it will be its duty to carry everything forward. At the moment, however, it is the intellectuals' duty to sacrifice themselves—because I believe that actually we can talk about a very big sacrifice. For a writer, for a painter, and for a pianist to give up a part of his time to others is a real sacrifice: We are all aware of the fact that in a quarter of a century, when—I hope—Romania will be a country among other European countries, a normal country, nobody will ask me what was I doing in these years; they will only ask me what books I have written. But apart from this firm awareness of a "loss" there is the absolute awarene? â ?f the fact that if in this moment we do not take part in the struggle, we will also be responsible for the dictatorship that begins.

Journalists Support ADEVARUL's Independence

AU1004165891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1525 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/4/1991—On April 9, 1991, representatives of the Journalists' Society of Romania the Federation of Trade Unions of the Whole Press, of the Romanian Journalists' Association and of the Hungarian Journalists' Association of Romania discussed about the conditions that had triggered the first warning strike in the Romanian central press.

"The unanimous decision of the employees of the daily 'ADEVARUL' editorial office and publishing house to turn that paper's editorial office into a joint-stock company whose shares should be fairly distributed, with no preferential share packages being held either by the state or by any companies or physical persons," a communique to the press reads, "is meant to ensure the editorial office's autonomy and the independent character of the newspaper now and in future."

The communique underlines that "the attitude of the former director who pretended to support the initiative

of the staff, while fighting it down 'behind the scenes' and advancing other variants instead to suit his own interests, is objectionable."

It points out that "the secret project to set up a joint state- private venture with an overwhelming majority of state capital (99.62 percent) did not only go against the legislation in force, but it was meant to make the paper subservient at least to executive power." The communique also evinces that "the size of capital and the secrecy of action warned about the major risk of having the state shares bought over by great capital owners in the private sector, as soon as the privatization law allowed it, with all subsequent effects upon the paper's profile, orientation and quality."

The representatives of the aforementioned journalist organizations "express their unconditional solidarity" with the action of protest of the "ADEVARUL" Trade Union.

Roman Meets Former ADEVARUL Director

AU1004170991 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1624 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/4/1991—Wednesday, April 10, Romania's prime minister, Petre Roman, received Mr. Darie Novaceanu together with other members of the daily "ADEVARUL" staff. The call had been requested by the latter, in order to state their case regarding the labour conflict under way at their newspaper.

Mr. Darie Novaceanu said that, in his capacity as director of a wholly state-owned unit, he could not agree to any form of privatization apt to lead to undue distribution of state capital. Therefore, he considered the only legal solution was to add private capital to that owned by the state, which was likely to give his newspaper the economic power it required, without impairing in any way its independence.

Concerning other ownership aspects of the dispute mentioned during the talks, the prime minister noted, inter alia, that "ADEVARUL" had been legally registered as state property in April 1990.

Agreeing that the staff should have been consulted about the future of "ADEVARUL" publishing house, a state-owned institution of national interest, before deciding whether to turn it into an autonomous enterprise or into a state-run commercial company, the prime minister underlined that, in case the latter variant was chosen, the privatization process following the creation of the state-run commercial company would proceed in accordance with law No. 15/1990 and Law No. 31/1990, as well as with any future regulations in the field.

Senate Session on Economy, Land Law, Moldova

AU1004135291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1313 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Bucharest, ROMPRES 10/4/1991—The April 10 morning session of Romania's Senate, presided over by Senate President Alexandru Barladeanu, started with questions to the executive addressed by eleven senators, most of them representing the FSN [National Salvation Front] majority group. They called the government's attention to a string of critical aspects of the socio-economic situation in counties, aspects resulting from the senators' contacts with the citizens in the brief break of the Senate proceedings.

The senators referred to the faulty way of interpretation and application of the Land Law, including the television propaganda and asked the government to correctly enforce the laws already passed in the parliament, and see to it that its own decisions no longer be at conflict with the laws, especially as regarded the population's supply with consumer goods where one could note grave infringements of the law, which bears negatively on the citizens.

In that respect, Senator Romulus Vulpescu demanded that the government should state its stand on the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, especially with regard to the Serpents' Island.

In the plenum of the Senate, Vice-President Vasile Mois, head of the Romanian parliamentary delegation that attended the CSCE Parliamentary Conference in Madrid, over April 2-3, accounted on the Romanian delegation's activity, the arguments regarding the modality of representation and voting.

Vice-President Mois reported that, pursuant to debates in the Madrid conference, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CSCE was set up and Romania would participate with a delegation of seven in its proceedings. The Parliamentary Assembly will hold its first session in Budapest and the Romanian party was assured that the next session would be held in Bucharest.

In a calm, working atmosphere the senators then discussed the bill of agricultural companies and other forms of association in agriculture. [passage omitted]

Government Social Protection Measures Viewed

AU1004170691 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1511 GMT 10 Apr 91

["Social Life: Labour Minister on Unemployment—Last Minute Information From Government Sources Quote Part-Time Jobless at 266,500 Persons and Full-Time Jobless at 25,353 Persons, Registered with Labour Exchanges"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/4/1991—Labour and Social Welfare Minister Catalin Zamfir made a few comments on the social protection measures undertaken by the Romanian Government, in an interview for the daily "ADEVARUL."

"The unemployment benefit system we have adopted is a long-tested one in modern Western and in transition societies; we see it as a reasonable unemployment benefit for a reasonable time interval." Concomitantly with the

coming into effect of the Unemployment Law, the labour exchange network was re-organised, with 190 new such units established in urban settlements, small ones included, and with flexible registration procedures, such as the issuance of unemployment benefit documents by the very sections or factories that have to shut down temporarily or for good.

About the so-called re-adjustment courses, the minister said: "A few months ago we initiated a sort of census of all our vocational training capacities and came to the conclusion that the material prerequisites for professional re-adaptation do exist. The problem of social re-insertion lies not so much in the lack of professional training as in a shortage of jobs." In this trend of ideas, Mr. Zamfir stressed the need for the identification of the existing job opportunities and the creation of new ones as far as the economy allows. "We have also opened special courses on legislation, marketing, accountancy for potential small-scale entrepreneurs."

To stimulate training of youths, Mr. Catalin Zamfir mentioned a methodology enabling an enterprise to employ an unskilled youth, train him for about nine months in exchange for unemployment benefit from the state and then instate his employment. "We also intend to hand out employment benefits in bulks, for the whole period they were granted, to serve as a nominal capital to those purporting to start a small business."

Reticence Toward Privatization Criticized

AU1004173591 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 5 Apr 91 pp 1, 2

[Claudiu Doltu article: "Comrades, You Are Building an Unsound Society"]

[Text] It is "unflinchingly" being said that Romania has embarked upon the road of "building" a new society; not a comprehensively developed socialist one, not a capitalist one, but a very original society. To be better understood and to avoid a diversion from the official line, we will use the sweet Marxist language. The main factor that determines the socioeconomic situation of the system of economic relations is the ownership of the means of production. The ownership is defined as the totality of economic relations established between the members of society regarding the acquisition, possession, utilization, and availability of the means of production and of the results of production. For years and years we enjoyed being owners, producers, and end-users. To a greater or lesser extent, we were producers, and we are enjoying the "benefits" of this triple quality to this very day. The slogan "equality for all members of society" is out. The hopes for an improvement in the standard of living are in the process of disappearing. Ownership of the means of production, today termed capital, no longer belongs to "all" but to the state. It seems that for a long time to come it will stay so.

Private ownership of capital existed even before 1989. It did not even amount to 1 percent of the whole collective patrimony. At this point, everyone says that he has understood the importance and necessity of privatization; however, it seems that a strange phenomenon has happened. The free initiative noted in the economy is welcomed with reticence and contempt by very many "end-users." "Private owners" seem to be the guilty ones; they are accused of wanting to get rich rapidly. The truly guilty ones are to be sought elsewhere, however. They initiate and guide the tendency toward profiteering and nonprofessionalism. They push investors toward discovering and making use of foul solutions to survive. Those who grant approvals and establish burdensome taxes are to be blamed. A mafia has formed and is growing among the ranks of those who have money. Although Law No. 18/1968 has not be abrogated it has not been applied any more since December 1989. Are thieves and dishonest businessmen tolerated so that the situation of the nomenklatura and Securitate people, who have newly become private owners, is not endangered? It seems so. It is alarming that there is a tendency toward rapidly getting rich and implicitly toward fiscal tax evasion. This attitude of private owners is mainly due to the insecurity they face regarding what they invest. There is nothing (yet) to guarantee a secure future for them. Each of them is managing as best as he can and opens the necessary doors the way he can.

Privatization is not an aim in itself; however, it is the only solution for Romania to emerge from its economic and social misery. This implies the loss of certain undeserved positions and privileges by certain individuals. Because of this conflict of interests efforts are made to discredit private ownership and initiative. One of the principles of dialectics affirms that contradiction is the source of progress. But if those who have assumed the responsibility of redressing the country (naming themselves National "Salvation" Front) place prestige and desire for power above the general interest of Romanians, then they are able to refute this principle. Through the institutions they control (government, Parliament, and presidency) those who have been elected are promoting tendencies and the interests of a social strata—private entrepreneurs—who want to strike roots and it will be difficult to change them.

ALFA, '15 Nov' Trade Unions Collaborate

AU1004170291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1621 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/4/1991—Bucharest hosted the first meeting of the executive leaderships of the "ALFA" Cartel and the "15 November" Inter-Trade Union Confederative Alliance.

On the occasion information was exchanged concerning the targets of the two trade union departments in the context of diminishing the population's standard of living, and appreciations were made in connection with the lack of social protection able to prevent its diminution beyond bearable

limits. The government's economic action is characterized as "pseudo-reform" and emphasis was placed on the risks of continuing that action.

The two trade union departments signed a convention concerning the collaboration and coordination of trade union fight actions aimed at defending trade union rights which could not be separated from the other fundamental human rights and freedoms, from the existence of safe institutions of the state of law, from a genuine liberalization of information, and emphasis was also placed on the necessity "to put an end to the influence the power exercises over the Romanian television."

Deputies View, Vote on Bill of Farming Companies

AU1004185791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1758 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/4/1991—The Wednesday, April 10, session of the Assembly of Deputies focused on the debate and approval by articles of the Bill of Farming Companies and other forms of association in agriculture. For almost five hours the deputies analysed numerous amendments proposed for all the 45 articles of the bill. Articles 79 and 80 which stipulate that the farming companies may enjoy advantages granted by subsequent laws as well as their right to employ workers occasioned heated discussions.

Before the bill was to be passed as a whole, a UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania] representative stated that his group would vote against it because it was meant to maintain the present cooperative farms. Also against the bill spoke a representative of the Liberal Party-Young Wing who argued his attitude with the fear that the law would allow the land distribution commissions to condition the issuance of property certificates on joining a farming company and would encourage other abuses.

A representative of the Liberal Parliamentary Group declared against the adoption of the bill considering it useless. In favour of the adoption of that fundamental act for the future of the Romanian agriculture declared firmly representatives of the FSN [National Salvation Front], of the Agrarian Democratic Party and of the Democratic Socialist Party who showed that only by associating would the owners of agricultural land be able to economically till it. It was also stressed that the association of owners would be an act of will exclusively and that the fear that it could lead to abuses was groundless.

As many as 243 deputies voted in favour of the bill, 40 voted against and 12 abstained.

UDMR Blames PUNR for Anti-Ethnic Attitude

AU1004201091 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1907 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/4/1991—The presidium of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [UDMR] speaks against the statement of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] concerning "the settlement of the national question" printed in the March 26 issue of the "ADEVARUL DE CLUJ" newspaper.

In a document sent to the ROMPRES national news agency the presidium of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania considers that the aforementioned statement contradicts the resolution in Alba Iulia on December 1, 1918 as well as the international documents on the ethnic minorities' status and Romania's laws taking into consideration that Romania in its capacity as signatory pledged to impart those international conventions the power of law.

The document considers the stand of the Romanian National Unity Party as anti-ethnic and anti-democratic, showing that that party's proposal according to which each ethnic minority be represented in parliament by only one deputy is incompatible with the elementary requirements of democracy.

The public opinion both in Romania and abroad the UDMR protest further shows cannot overlook the phenomenon that occurred, much more so as in comparison with other such manifestations expressed until now only in the extremist press now we face the official stand of a party which is also represented in Parliament.

Foreign Minister on Treaty With Soviet Union

AU1004133491 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1200 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/4/1991—"A clever administration of the present moment" is how Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase terms the recent treaty with the Soviet Union.

In an interview with daily DIMINEATA Minister Nastase considers that the treaty "takes account of all Romanian interests" and "it does not entail servitudes on options, but means merely a clever administration of the present moment, allowing for the building of a framework congenial for the discussion of other matters as well, such as, for instance, aspects concerning the Romanian treasure taken to Russia during the First World War and the Serpents' Island". All this, the Romanian minister mentioned, can be discussed, a solution can be sought in future to the extent to which we ensure the due political climate. The treaty ensures in this respect also the normative framework apt to influence the future in the positive, the answer to all our questions and especially the flow of relations with our eastern neighbor which is and will remain important. To us, Adrian Nastase showed, the Soviet Union is an important source of raw materials and it is equally an extremely attractive outlet. In our economic conditions, this situation needs formal expression in an agreement of cooperation that should allow for the fluent achievement of contacts and relations at the level of economic agents. Another important point is the clarification in very open talks of the thorny issues in the bilateral relations with

the Soviet Union, said Minister Nastase, opining that positive results in these matters cannot be achieved by confrontation, but by permanent and very frank dialogue, that should however be pragmatically and constructively oriented. Here too, there are several elements. The Republic of Moldova first. We should settle after all the way how we view our relation with Moldova. In this respect the Romanian minister highlighted: our relation with the Republic of Moldova, with our brothers in that republic, is of outstanding importance. But the link will have to be monitored in a coherent manner, at a government level. Hence, Nastase explained, the idea to organize a state undersecretariat under the Romanian Foreign Ministry to handle the relations with the Republic of Moldova.

Nastase Meets French Officials in Paris

AU1004133791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1156 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/4/1991—Tuesday, 9 April, Romania's Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, on a visit to Paris, met at Quai d'Orsay Mrs. Elisabeth Guigou, minister—delegate with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of European affairs. The two stressed the importance paid by the governments of the two countries to the visit President Francois Mitterrand is going to pay to Romania. Certain project were delineated meant to back the development of Romanian-French relations, among which a bilateral cooperation treaty, the opening of consulates on a reciprocity basis. The two ministers exchanged opinions on the points of view of the two governments as concerns the new political configuration of the European continent. They also referred to the project of France's President Francois Mitterrand for the edification of an "European confederation".

Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase also met with Jean Claude Paye, secretary-general of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], who referred to the organization's positive attitude as far as the cooperation with Romania is concerned. He said Romanian experts had already participated in a number of activities of the OECD center for cooperation with European economies of transition. The Romanian minister offered details on the economic reforms, the legislative and institutional acts initiated in Romania for the passage to the market economy. OECD proved to be willing to back the efforts of the Romanian Government. The two parties expressed their wish to find adequate ways of joint action.

Attends Colloquium

AU1004205691 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2005 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Excerpts] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/4/1991—The president of France's National Assembly, Laurent Fabius, and the president of the Senate, Alain Poher, had separate interviews with the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, Adrian Nastase, now on a visit to Paris.

Then, the Romanian minister attended, at the French Senate, a colloquium occasioned by the commemoration of half a century since the death of great diplomat and politician Nicolae Titulescu, event also attended by the president of the Senate, Alain Poher. [passage omitted]

Referring to his political meetings in Paris, Adrian Nastase stated that the Romanian-French relations were on an upward course which would be better seen on the forthcoming visit President Mitterrand was to pay to Bucharest.

Neagu Hopes For EC Aid in Privatization Process

AU1104090291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2139 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Geneva (ROMPRES) 10/4/1991—Romania is resolved to integrate itself in the West European political and economic structures which proved their efficiency and validity, stated Romulus Neagu, secretary of state, member of government, at the Wednesday plenary session of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, gathered in its annual session at le Palais des Nations in Geneva.

The Romanian chief delegate said that after ten months of activity in the legislative and executive areas, a real progress was made in setting a legal and organizational framework for the operation of the institutions of the state of law and of the market economy mechanism.

A legal framework has been established in Romania to attract foreign investment and conditions have been put in place comparable with those in other countries undergoing a transition. We count on the valuable contribution the resources of international economic and financial institutions can make to supporting our efforts, the speaker stressed. Thanking the European Community, its member states, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for their assistance, the speaker underscored that Romania placed great hopes in its cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Romanian dignitary assured that Romania was willing to take an active part in the development and diversification of trade, economic, technical, scientific and financial cooperation with all the UN/ECE member countries, within the commission as well as at a subregional and bilateral level.

We hope that, on the basis of the proposals set forth to the delegates, the present session will agree upon further measures to support national privatization processes, encourage the activity of small and medium-sized companies and attract foreign investors, Mr. Romulus Neagu said.

Soviet Foreign Minister Interviewed on Visit

AU1004202691 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 91 pp 16, 17

["Exclusive" interview with USSR Foreign Affairs Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh by Manojlo Vukotic in Belgrade on 8 April: "Integrity of Yugoslavia: Prerequisite for Europe's Stability"—first two paragraphs are BORBA introduction]

[Text] After 70 days at the helm of the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry, the experienced diplomatic negotiator, 58-year old Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, arrived for his first visit to Yugoslavia at about 1100 yesterday.

Before talks with his host [Federal Foreign Affairs Secretary] Budimir Loncar, Minister Bessmertnykh received BORBA's editor in chief Manojlo Vukotic in the "Mostar" residence and kindly agreed to answer several questions.

[Vukotic] You are visiting Yugoslavia for the first time in your capacity as minister of foreign affairs of the USSR. Could you tell us what the main topic of the talks with your colleague Budimir Loncar will be?

[Bessmertnykh] This is indeed my first visit to the SFRY in this capacity although this is not my first meeting with Budimir Loncar. We already had a detailed conversation in Madrid in February this year, and have also been in contact via telephone.

Our countries proceed from similar positions regarding the main issues of world politics. In connection with this, I think that the central theme of our talks in Belgrade will be the assessment of the possibilities of how to broaden and improve Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation, especially in the sphere of politics. We plan to discuss the state of general European trends, solutions to the Middle East in the context of the present situation in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, prospects for cooperation in the Balkans, and a number of other issues.

[Vukotic] Could you specifically present the Soviet view on events in Yugoslavia and the process of transformation of the Yugoslav federation?

[Bessmertnykh] We are guided by the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and do not approve of the attempts to internationalize Yugoslav internal affairs. The Soviet Union favors the preservation of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and considers this to be one of the major prerequisites for stability in Europe.

How the internal problems of sovereign Yugoslavia will be solved—this a matter for its people. They will themselves decide, without any interference from outside, on how they will live. Regarding Yugoslavia, it is necessary that all parties respect the CSCE principles and contribute with their actions and statements to the calming of the situation, and help the SFRY find a way out of the present complex situation.

We are convinced that the Yugoslav peoples will surmount their difficulties and troubles, that they will successfully accomplish the tasks that were set by history, and that they will solve delicate problems. I wish them all the luck in it.

[Vukotic] Political and economic changes in our countries will undoubtedly affect economic cooperation between our countries. Can this cooperation be enriched with new forms and content. How can the problem of the Soviet trade deficit be resolved?

[Bessmertnykh] Innovation will not only have an effect on the state of economic ties in the future, but it is already doing so today, and unfortunately in a negative way, too. It has been demonstrated that both countries have to a some extent been insufficiently prepared for the transition (at the beginning of this year) to trade in free convertible currency. This is one of the reasons for the decline in trade. I do not think that this situation should be overdramatized, however, or that political significance should even be attached to it. It is now more important to jointly determine the possibilities of preserving everything that is useful and mutually suitable in our economic ties and remove the obstacles on the road to their rational development. I am convinced that the consistent reform of the economic system will facilitate not only the stabilization of the situation in the national economy, but also lead to the creation of new forms of our bilateral cooperation that will correspond to the market way of conducting business affairs.

Regarding the problem of the Soviet trade deficit, the program for solving it has been fixed in the bilateral documents and foresees additional deliveries of the agreed amounts of Soviet goods until mid 1994.

"Super Power" Only a Term

[Vukotic] Has the Soviet Union ceased to be a super power in the old sense because of its economic difficulties, despite the fact that it continues to be a foundation and an exceptionally influential factor in the international community?

[Bessmertnykh] The Soviet Union was and has remained a great state in the "old" and any other sense. If you like, the USSR is a super power regarding the greatest responsibility for the destiny of peace and civilization that our state bears. There is a whole complex of political, economic, and geographic factors that predetermine our country's prominent role in the world arena. Apart from this, the potential of our country and the peoples that live here also guarantees their great future from the distant historical perspective. Even now that we are going through one of the most difficult periods of our development, which is linked with the main structural changes, realistically minded politicians do not see a solution to international problems without the active participation of the Soviet Union. The Middle East, European processes, evolution in the Asian-Pacific

region, the further reduction of tension in Central America—the Soviet Union has a balanced view to express on all this and many other issues.

We do not have to mention that a great road is also before humankind in lifting the burden of excessive armament. The Soviet Union, which has urged many daring initiatives, will continue to play a central role in this task. In the final analysis, the term "super power" is only a term. "Super statehood" is not the aim of politics. This is the objective reality, however, that is manifested. I repeat, in the special political and historical responsibility that should not be avoided.

[Vukotic] How do you assess the idea of conservatives in the USSR that the "final myth of perestroyka is now collapsing—the myth of the Soviet Union's successful foreign policy"? To what extent and how does the internal instability of the USSR restrict and hinder the implementation of Soviet foreign policy?

[Bessmertnykh] To be frank, I do not see any particular reason for dispute in this respect. Looking at matters realistically, can it be denied that the world situation has essentially changed in the last six years, and for the better, and that Soviet foreign policy has played a decisive role in this? I am convinced that in responding to primarily the national interests of the Soviet Union, our policy is in line with general human interests.

The transition that is under way in relations with the United States from confrontation to mutual understanding and mutual cooperation, overcoming the rift in Europe, the normalization of relations with China, the beginning of nuclear disarmament, international cooperation that imbues everything—all this has, in my opinion, become the timely response to all those questions which history has asked us.

The internal situation undoubtedly has an influence on foreign policy, making it either easier or more difficult to bring it to life. Of course, elements of internal instability do not make the work of diplomats easier.

Under these circumstances, I am sure that there must be an even more active foreign policy that can in its own way contribute to a more constructive course of events in our country. It is in this spirit that we are also endeavoring to work.

[The following passages appear boxed within the body of the item]

Gorbachev's Blessing

[Vukotic] Minister, are you perhaps carrying with you a special message for Yugoslav leaders from President Gorbachev?

[Bessmertnykh] I talked with the president before my departure. The nurturing of good relations between two countries is clearly very important and significant for both sides. We have a lot to say to each other, in a friendly and open way. President Gorbachev has blessed this visit.

[Vukotic] Perhaps there could soon be a visit by one or other of the presidents?

[Bessmertnykh] If both sides are interested in this, it is not difficult to reach agreement without too great a procedure.

The Reality of Diplomacy

[Vukotic] You have held the post of foreign minister for 71 days. Are your plans being realized? In the last few days, you have already arranged for President Gorbachev to visit Japan and China.

[Bessmertnykh] A plan of work exists and it could be said that its realization is going well at the moment. Of course, things are also changing because new events happen. These are realistic plans—but both reality and pragmatism are important in diplomacy.

JNA Officer Cadre Representation Detailed

LD1004160891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1004 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—Despite the efforts to establish parity republican and provincial representation within the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] officer cadre, the cadre entry from some federal units is inadequate. The above-average drop-out of cadets from the ranks of some of our nations and nationalities during their training also influences these shifts in the structure of the officer cadre. This was stressed by the Federal Executive Council [FEC] in its reply to a question raised by Ekrem Ajanovic and Vlado Pandzic, delegates in the Chamber of the Republics and Provinces, on the degree to which some nations and nationalities are represented in the JNA.

The federal government has passed on the information on the percentage increase and decrease in the number of military personnel on active service during the past 20 years. From this it transpires that 7 percent of Montenegrins were employed on these duties in 1971 [as received] whereas in 1990 their percentage representation was reduced to 5.2 percent. During the same period the Croatian percentage representation dropped from 13.4 to 12.5 and the Slovene percentage fell from 3.7 to 2.3.

The Macedonian share in the composition of military personnel on active service increased from 5.8 percent to 7.3 percent, that of Muslims from 1.3 percent to 5.2 percent, that of Albanians from 0.3 percent to 1.4 percent, and that of Hungarians from 0.5 percent to just over 1 percent.

In 1971, 60.4 percent of officers on active service were Serbs; their percentage has now dropped to 54.2. At the same time the percentage of Yugoslavs has increased from 6.1 to 9.2.

The FEC stresses that it can be realistically assumed that every effort is being made to secure an even percentage representation in the top command cadre, after a comparison has been made regarding the number of generals in relation to the number of colonels. Now we have a situation whereby there are 14 colonels to every Montenegrin general, 10 colonels to every Croatian general, nine colonels to every Macedonian or Muslim general, six colonels to every Slovene general, 20 colonels to every Serbian general, five colonels to every Albanian general, and 18 colonels to every Yugoslav general.

Because of insufficient interest in a military career, the FEC reply stresses, there is a shortage of Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, Albanians, and Hungarians in the present national structure of command cadre, although the number of top-ranking officers (generals and colonels) in each of the aforementioned cases is proportional to the number of officers, or even higher.

Constitutional Court Rulings Reported

LD1004162391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1205 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—The Serbian law on collective agreements is anti-constitutional and at odds with the federal law on wages. The decision on this was given by the Yugoslav Constitutional Court (YCC) today.

The court today rescinded the Serbian and Croatian government decisions on special republican taxes on firms' display boards and the use of business premises and building sites, because they are anti-constitutional. The decision on anti-dumping measures by the Serbian Republic was also declared null and void.

The Croatian government proposal that the court should lift the temporary ban on the application of certain provisions of the law on the Croatian agency for reconstruction and development, whose legality is under consideration, was rejected.

The YCC today ruled that the Serbian law on universities is at odds with the federal law on basic employment rights. The court set in motion the procedure to assess the constitutionality of federal and all republican public information laws, because of a suspicion that the paragraph on the right to correction may not be constitutional.

A procedure against the law on military courts was set in motion, because according to this law lack of moral and political suitability can be the reason for one to be released early as a military court judge or as a judge assessor.

A public discussion will be held on the Serbian law on the conduct of republican services in special circumstances. [passage omitted]

The procedure concerning all the above-mentioned regulations was initiated by the Federal Executive Council. The YCC did not receive a reply from the Serbian government to a single issue concerning "their" regulations.

The Serbian Assembly must harmonize its law on universities with the federal law on employment rights within six months, because it prescribes that a teacher's employment is terminated at the end of the school year in which he reaches the age of 65; this curtails management rights to decide on the question. [passage omitted]

Tudjman Chairs Croatian Supreme Council Session

LD1004193591 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1331 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Zagreb, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman chaired yesterday's first session of the [Croatian] Supreme Council of State [vrhovno drzavno vijece].

A statement issued today by the office of the Croatian president states that in accordance with a presidential decision, and on the basis of appropriate provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, this consultative body has replaced the present Council for National Defense and Protection of the Constitutional System.

Several topical issues pertaining to domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Croatia, the statement says, were on the session agenda.

"Among other things, the organizational and institutional reorganization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs police forces was discussed with a view to greater operational efficiency and better training. Numerical limits were established for police centers of the regular police force, while a section of the forces, especially the special purpose forces, to acquire a more suitable organization and training, were placed under the defense ministry as a special formation, the National Guard Corps [Zbor njarodne garde]," the statement says, adding that its basic task will be "To protect the constitutional system and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, which is a subject of reciprocal coordination of activity between the internal affairs and defense ministries."

Extension of the network of Repubic of Croatia offices and missions abroad was also discussed. Dr. Frame Golem, until now the foreign affairs minister, was appointed plenipotentiary representative of the Republic of Croatia in Washington, while Janko Vraniczany-Dobrinovic, until now minister for tourism, was appointed plenipotentiary representative in the EC in Brussels. In this context, the necessary cadre changes in the Croatian government ministries involved were discussed.

"The results of the meetings of the presidents of all the republics were also discussed during the Supreme Council of State session, the statement notes, in light of the discussion, standpoints for the forthcoming meeting to be hosted by the Republic of Slovenia, and also the

instructions for the work of the group of experts due to meet today with corresponding experts from the Republic of Serbia, were laid down."

Among other things the Supreme Council of State was briefed on the content of the written messages received by the president of the Republic from SFRY Presidency President Borisav Jovic and from Patriarch Pavel of the Serbian Orthodox Church. After discussion it was agreed that President Tudjman should provide a cogent reply to these letters, which have been made available to the public.

"During the council session an assessment was made of the demonstrations that took place in Zagreb and Split in connection with the start of the trial of Defense Minister Martin Spegelj and six prominent men from Virovitica before the military court. The Supreme Council of State has expressed its regret that despite the understandable indignation of the citizens because of this rigged Stalinist trial, property was damaged. Croatian forces of order will, in the future, protect peace and public order even more vigorously, and the damage that has been caused will be made good," the statement says.

The statement says that the Supreme Council of State has been set up as a consultative body by decision of the Croatian president on the basis of Articles 100 and 106 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.

The statement says that council members are the prime minister and president of the Croatian Assembly, the republican representative in the SFRY Presidency, the defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs ministers, and the head of the Office for the Protection of the constitutional System of the Republic of Croatia. Other council members are appointed by the president of the Republic of Croatia, and, in accordance with a standing decision, they are the government deputy prime ministers and the head of the Office of the President of the Republic.

"The Supreme Council of State—as a consultative body of the president of the republic—will discuss important domestic and external state policy issues, especially those pertaining to national defense and protection of the constitutional system of the Republic of Croatia, and will propose legislative and administrative guidelines, conclusions and decisions concerning the protection of the sovereignty and interests of the republic of Croatia," the statement notes.

Tudjman Warns Jovic on Constitutional Order

LD1104091691 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0822 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Letter from Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in reply to letter from SFRY Presidency President Borisav Jovic published in Zagreb; date not given]

[Text] Zagreb, 11 Apr (TANJUG)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has replied to a letter sent by SFRY Presidency President Borisav Jovic in connection with the Zagreb demonstrations in front of the military court. The reply was published late last night in Zagreb. Here is the reply:

"Mr. President: your publicly revealed letter about protests that broke out in Zagreb and Split in connection with the opening of the trial of Croatian Defense Minister Martin Spegelj and six innocent prominent citizens of Virovitica at the Zagreb military court shows that you remain true to your single-minded understanding and interpretation of the political crisis in the country.

"I express sincere astonishment that you did not issue a similar protest to units in the Serbian Republic during the 9 March disturbances, which, as you know, assumed larger proportions and had more serious consequences. A spontaneous protest of citizens of the Croatian Republic at the Stalinist-type process, which we believed to belong to the past, broke out as an expression of indignation at the degradation and humiliation that such a trial caused among the Croatian public. This judicial farce harms mostly the standing of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], and your letter harms the standing of the SFRY Presidency, which you lead. I remind you that we have asked several times that in the interest of reducing tension and preventing even more hatred between the Army and the people, the SFRY Presidency's decisions on which the indictment is based be revoked.

"I share your view that law and order organizations in each republic should ensure peace and order efficiently. I assure you that only peaceful political protests, as a means of democratic political expression, are acceptable to us; therefore, we will oppose even more energetically any form of violence and disturbance in Zagreb, Split, Knin, and elsewhere in the Croatian Republic.

"In this sense, organizations of the Croatian Republic have already detained 12 people and are carrying out further investigations into disturbances in Zagreb, Split, and Sibenik. The investigations have already revealed that numerous persons who are not citizens of the Croatian Republic took part in disturbances and attacks on property. The damage inflicted will be compensated.

"All bodies of power of the Croatian Republic have a task to secure normal conditions for work of all citizens and institutions, including military bodies, on Croatian territory.

"The Croatian government will persist in its resolute stand in favor of a democratic resolution of the SFRY

crisis, but it will undertake everything necessary for the protection of the constitutional order of its republic," the statement concludes.

Party Statement Stresses Federal Sovereignty

LD1004175791 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1321 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, April 10 (TANJUG)—The central board of the Party of Yugoslavs proposes in a statement issued today that all citizens and political subjects who really care about Yugoslavia should confirm their acceptance of a declaration on the country's sovereignty by signing it.

The party, which is based in Zagreb, capital of the republic of Croatia, is active throughout the country.

The first of the 17 articles of the declaration states that "Yugoslavia alone is a sovereign state on its entire internationally recognized territory."

In accordance with this, only Yugoslavia is a truly autonomous, legitimate, legal, integral and internationally recognized subject of international law, and not the parts of which it consists, the declaration states.

Yugoslavia's citizens are the source of Yugoslavia's sovereignty, and not its collectivities (peoples, nations, classes, parties), the statement says.

It emphasizes that Yugoslavia is not and must not be "a simple sum of its parts, a mere negotitated association of its republics and provinces and even less a single market or a sum of common functions of a federation or a confederation."

The statement also warns that sovereignty based on ethnic principles is in its essence lop-sided, anachronistic and ultimately fatal because it leads to nationalism which can only result in Yugoslavia's collapse.

Defense Ministry To Run Special Police Forces

LD1004210491 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1722 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Zagreb, April 10 (TANJUG)—The Supreme State Council of the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia has decided to place the Republican Defence Ministry in charge of special police forces, it was announced here today.

The forces are now in the competence of the Croatian Interior Ministry.

The Council, founded by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, held its first meeting last night, the announcement said.

The principal task of the units which will come within the competence of the Defence ministry will be the "protection of Croatia's constitutional order and territorial integrity."

Forces of the Croatian Interior Ministry, including the special units, have thus far on several occasions intervened in areas with predominantly Serb populations which proclaimed secession from Croatia.

Serbian, Macedonian Deputies' Mandates Approved

LD1004201791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1130 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Summary] Belgrade, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—The Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the SFRY Assembly today verified the mandate of the Serbian and Macedonian delegations.

"The Chamber of Republics and Provinces verified the mandate of delegates of the Macedonian Assembly and the Serbian People's Assembly elected at the multiparty elections in these two republics.

"The following will represent the Serbian People's Assembly in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces: Aleksandar Bakocevic; Radoman Bozovic; Miroslav Zdravkovic; Batric Jovanovic; Jovan Nikolic; Zivojin Rajkovic; Ilija Rosic; Milan Svabic; Slobodanka Sosevic; Slobodan Rakitic; Dragoljub Micunovic; and Mahmut Memic.

"The mandate of 11 delegates of the Macedonian Assembly was verified today. The mandate of the 12th member of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces from this republic will be verified at a later date, when the Macedonian Assembly elects him or her. The following will represent Macedonia in this Assembly Chamber: Lambe Arnaudov; Aleksandar Gestakovski; Petar Gosev; Ljubisav Ivanov; Georgi Kotevski; Vanco Mladenov; Pance Nasev; Simon Naumovski; Tomislav Stefanovski; Tomislav Stojanovski; and Ismet Ramadani.

"The Serbian Socialist Party has nine delegates, and the Serbian Renaissance Party, the Democratic Party, and the Party of Democratic Action [Stranka Demokratske Akcije] one each.

"Out of 11 Macedonian delegates, three are members of the Macedonian League of Communists, one is a joint delegate of the Macedonian League of Communists and the Party for Democratic Prosperity [Partija za Demokratski Prosperitet]. The Socialist Party [Socijalisticka Partija], the Alliance of Reformist Forces, and the Party for Democratic Prosperity each have a delegate. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity has four delegates.

"The multiparty constitution of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the SFRY Assembly has thus been completed."

Following this, the Chamber of Republics and Provinces adopted decisions regarding incursions into the single monetary system.

"Afterwards, the chamber elected the new deputy federal secretary for finacnes, Slavoljub Stanic, in place of Vuk Ognjanovic, who was relieved from the post to take up a new one.

"At the end of the session, Chamber President Milan Mejak told the delegates that the Slovene Assembly has informed him that the mandate of three Slovene delegates has expired due to their retirement. They are Martin Mlinar, Franc Krizmancic, and Tone Ferenc. The Slovene delegation is now down to nine members."

Draskovic Calls For Preserving United Country

LD1004191691 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1428 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Statement by Serbian Renaissance Movement Chairman Vuk Draskovic at news conference for foreign and domestic journalists in Belgrade on 10 April]

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—The Serbian Renaissance Movement (SPO) believes that, apart from the political crisis and mutual disagreements, the preservation of a united Yugoslavia is the best solution. The party also believes that in such a situation it would be necessary to organize some sort of a "cantonization" of the country, which means that the autonomy of regions in which one nation is in the majority would be recognized, above all the autonomy of Serbs in Croatia.

The autonomy of Istria and Dubrovnik could also be recognized. Parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, without moving the borders, could also be marked as Croatian, Serbian, or Muslim. This proposal would include the autonomy of western Macedonia with the majority Albanian population.

In case of conflicts or armed clashes in general, Draskovic noted while warning about this possibility, Slovenia would most probably secede while Croatia, bearing in mind historic developments, would remain without the parts inhabitted by Serbs but with western Hercegovina and part of Kupres.

Calling for good-neighborly relations, tolerance, and patience, Draskovic said that judging by the opening of official talks on the country's future, "they can only lead to a massacre for no reason at all." He was categorical in his stand that representatives of all the parties in the legislature should take part in future talks about Serbia and Croatia.

Clarifying a number of questions raised by journalists, Draskovic said that personally he "did not believe that there would be any conflicts, that Croatia is being led by sensible men and not the likes of Djodan, Seks, and Broz." He stressed that all stands referring to a possible armed conflict were hypothetical and that one should bear in mind that both Serbs and the other nations would live in one state only if Yugoslavia survived as an entity.

Serbian Prime Minister Survives Confidence Vote

LD1004143191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—The People's Assembly of Serbia today passed a vote of confidence in Serbian Prime Minister Dragutin Zelenovic by majority of votes. The vote was 156 in favor, 18 against, and three abstentions. As a result, the oppostiion demand to relieve the prime minister from his post because of his inadequate and inappropriate behavior during March demonstrations was not accepted. The government was given the opportunity to present its economic program, which it will do after a recess this afternoon.

Justice Minister Passes Vote

LD1004143891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1350 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—The majority of people's deputies of the Serbian Assembly by a show of hands today passed a vote of confidence in Serbian Minister of Justice Predrag Todorovic.

An initiative to relieve Todorovic of his post was launched by a group of deputies of the Serbian Renaissance Movement saying that citizens were arrested and maltreated without justification during demonstrations on 9 March, for which the justice minister is the most responsible.

Industry Minister Retains Post

LD1004140891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1311 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—Serbian Industry Minister Dusan Matkovic will keep his post in the Serbian government. Deputies of the Serbian Assembly have passed a vote of confidence in Dusan Matkovic with 166 votes for, 38 against, and four abstentions.

A group of 20 opposition deputies demanded an investigation into the responsibility of the Serbian industry minister in connection with his speech at a Serbian Socialist Party meeting at Usce.

Opposition Files Suit Against Belgrade Media

LD1004180491 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1512 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, April 10 (TANJUG)—Three processes opened in the regional business court in Belgrade today, in which two Serbian opposition parties have brought suit against Belgrade Radio and Television, one of its reportes, and the Republic of Serbia.

Two suits were brought by the strongest Serbian Opposition Party—the Serbian Renewal [Renaissance] Movement, and the third by the National Farmers' Party.

Under these suits, which also ask for compensation, Belgrade Radio and Television had, during the election campaign late last year, brought damages upon these parties by "shortening the time allotted for presentation of deputy and presidential candidates" on television, whose founder is the Republic of Serbia.

Reporter Slavko Budihna of Belgrade Television has been sued, among other things, for reading a politically insulting and unfounded commentary on the prime time television news, which was aimed at discrediting the Serbian Renewal Movement.

The fact that Belgrade Television refused to announce this party's denial of the commentary was one of the reasons for the holding of the demonstrations by Serbian opposition parties on March 9 in Belgrade.

In the demonstrations, the opposition demanded the resignations of the leadership of Belgrade Television. The demands were met, but only after the demonstrators and police clashed (which resulted in the deaths of two people), student demonstrations broke out, and a violent session of Serbian Parliament was held.

Serbian Deputies Protest Lack of TV Coverage

LD1004110291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1023 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—At the very start of the Serbian Assembly session today, almost all opposition deputies walked out because Belgrade Television did not carry a live relay of the session this morning. Assembly Vice President Borivoje Petrovic commented that the decision was not made by the assembly, but probably by Belgrade Television. The particular reason for the dissatisfaction of opposition deputies was the fact that the public was unable to follow the debate now in progress on the motion that Industry Minister Dusan Matkovic should submit his resignation.

During the afternoon session, Serbian Prime Minister Dr. Dragutin Zelenovic will present a report on his government program.

Slovene Information Official Relieved of Post

LD1004164491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1315 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Summary] Ljubljana, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—The Slovene Assembly's commission for elections, appointments and cadre issues today decided to relieve the head of the assembly information service, Alenka Leskovic, of the post.

Paper Cited on Prospects for Military Industry

LD1004150291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1104 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, April 10 (TANJUG)—Electronic and electrical engineering products will dominate in the Yugoslav military industry's exports this year.

The quality of products of the Yugoslav military industry in this field is on a world level, the Yugoslav newspaper PRIVREDNI PREGLED writes, citing Colonel Anastas Paligoric's address at recent consultations on the prospects of the development of economic relations between the developing countries.

By the end of March this year, the Yugoslav military industry concluded agreements for 60 percent of the volume of deals realized last year and plans 47 percent more. Thirty three countries are pariticipating in the deals, of which most are developing countries.

The Yugoslav military industry has in the past 10 years exported various products worth 12.5 billion dollars. The Soviet Union and Iraq were its biggest partners in military-economic cooperation in that period.

Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, India, Kuwait and Algeria have also been important markets for products of the Yugoslav military industry in recent years.